SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
AND GOVERNANCE
IN THE PHILIPPINES

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CHAPTER 7

Muslim Governance and Salafi Orthodoxy

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The spread of Salafi orthodoxy (also known as the Wahabi-Salafi-Jihadist creed or sometimes shortened, Salafism) changed the dynamics of present-day believing Muslims. Using petro-dollars to build mosques, disseminate unscholarly translations of Qur'an and hadiths, and provide bursaries to Muslim Filipinos to learn Salafi orthodoxy in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, lead to the disturbance of pre-1960s polyphony of Islamicate cultures in the region. From forbidding Christmas greetings, wearing Saudi/Arab-styled clothing, banning certain music, disenfranchising women to treating non-Muslims (even Muslims that do not subscribe to Salafi orthodoxy) as enemies of the religion. It raises the pertinent question of how, in just over a half century, Salafi orthodoxy penetrated Moro's multicultural traditions. The article started addressing Muslim perspectives on authority and territoriality as imperative components of an ideal Muslim governance. Despite these ideal notions in Muslim history, the last section presented an aberrant ideology that had supplanted historical views on authority and territoriality. Salafi orthodoxy became the dominant political theology which had affected the security of contemporary Muslim Filipinos.

Authority

The concept of authority in Islam is one of the most difficult to assess; political authority is especially ambiguous. Contestation over political authority is the prime reason why political and theological divisions emerged (i.e., Sunni vs. Shi'a), particularly after the death of the Prophet. The Prophet's multiple roles as religious founder, political leader, head of state, and spiritual guide comprised the key understanding of the concept of political authority (Khan, 2014b, p. 521). His political and diplomatic abilities in concluding treaties, as in the Medina Charter and the Hudaybiyya Treaty (Piscatori, 1986, p. 49), are worth emulating. Fazlur Rahman (1986, p. 88) argues that leadership in Islam stems from the Qur'anic revelation (3:104) that recites: "Let there be of you a community who calls (people) to virtue, commands good and prohibits evil, these shall be the successful ones."

Some would argue that "authority belongs to ummah" (Al-Barghouti, 2008, p. 37; Newell, 2007, p. 7), while others contend that authority is only possessed by God. Iqbal (1986, p. 37) asserts that authority lies with God alone and that laws in Islam have already been legislated through the revealed Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. Thus, the leader of the community or head of state has no legislative power, and if there is a need to alter or modify some laws, he/she must, first, appoint advisers (although their opinions are not binding), and second, subordinate altered laws to the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Iqbal, 1986, p. 38). In principle and in theory, supreme authority lies only with God and not with the ruler of the state.

However, Hallaq (2003, pp. 244–245) insists that "Islamic law derives its authority not just because it is believed to be the law of God, for hermeneutically God did not reveal a law but only textual signs or textual indications that were to remain empty of legal significance had they been left unexplored." Thus, the agents of interpreting the texts and making it into laws are solely the jurists. They are responsible for the interpretative construction, methodology, and codification of the Qur'an and the Sunnah into Islamic law (Hallaq, 2001). But the legislative activities of jurists are limited to three functions: "(1) to enforce laws in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunnah (these are the primary Islamic sources); (2) to bring all existing laws in conformity with the Qur'an and the Sunnah; and (3) to make laws as subordinate legislation which do not violate the primary Islamic sources" (Iqbal, 1986, pp. 49–50). Crone (2004, pp. 286–287) adds that early Muslim government was all about the lawful maintenance of a moral order.

The jurists' discursive construction of the texts required constant interpretation and commentary in "which their schools of law were not only elaborated but also expanded and modified to meet the exigencies of changing times" (Zaman, 2002, p. 38). The identity and authority of their schools of jurisprudence were preserved and maintained through their commentaries, interpretations of Islamic sources, and fiat (or fatwas) that served as forms of dialogue between the past, present, and future generations of scholars in expounding the Qur'an and hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). However, their roles and duties were challenged by the emergence of lay interpretations of non-jurists that fragmented their authority (Robinson, 2009, pp.

345–348). Particularly in the globalized internet age, any individual with proper higher education may have the audacity to solely interpret Islamic sources, even without looking back to classical texts produced by scholars in medieval times.

From another perspective, Arjomand (1988, p. 1) opined that obedience is an important component of authority, as evidently stated in the Qur'an 4:59, that is, "O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you …" And "those authorities" are entitled to issue commands since Sunni Islam considers a caliph as heir to the Prophet, and succeeding authorities and subjects are obligated to obey the caliph. The collection of hadiths (sayings) of the Prophet "facilitated a great expansion in the scope and detail of the rules derived from God's law" (Hefner, 2011, p. 13–14) in relation to the duties and responsibilities of the ruler. One may argue that there are two bases of authority revealed in the Qur'an: the din (religion) and the *mulk* (temporal rule) (Arjomand, 1988, pp. 1–2). Leadership is associated with another Qur'anic term, *sultan*, representing the sole legitimate political authority during the age of empires in Muslim civilization.

To Al-Barghouti (2008), the political expression of authority is manifested through the creation of the *dawlah*, a political concept referring to any authoritative political arrangement that is not necessarily associated with supreme power or sovereignty. Throughout Islamic civilization, the *dawlah* evolved into a caliphate (Khan, 2009, pp. 447–473). Sunni scholars elaborated the significance of the elective nature of the leader (imam) (Al-Barghouti, 2008, p. 38) as restricted to only having executive power, but Shi'a scholars emphasized the infallible nature (Arjomand, 1988, p. 3) of the imam, who has inclusive powers over the government's executive, legislative, and judicial roles (Rahman, 1986, p. 92). During the peak of the Abbasid dynasty, the leader (caliph) possessed both religious (Krämer & Schmidtke, 2006) and secular (political) jurisdictions of authority, that is, a combination (Zubaida, 2003) of an imam and a sultan. However, there is a balance (equilibrium) (Ayubi, Hashemi, & Qureshi, 2009) of designation of powers, and these are distributed among "the caliph as guardian of the community and the faith, the ulama or religious scholars involved in the function of rendering religio-legal advice, and the judges who settle disputes according to religious laws" (Ayubi, 1991, p. 23). In

addition, "the influence of religion in all aspects of life in the society thus confirmed the social role of ulama" (Akbarzadeh & Saeed, 2003, p. 21).

Before the advent of dynastic families or hereditary political power in Muslim polities, the Sunni tradition of selecting a leader was usually done through rigorous mutual consultations (*shura*) among selected stakeholders (mostly "senior" scholars) of the community. Next, a binding and consensual (ijma) decision was made, in which the chosen or elected leader took an oath of allegiance while the ruled made a pledge of obeisance through the process of *bay'ah* (or a social contract between them). Some scholars have argued that the process of *shura* may be binding (Rahman, 1986, p. 91) or not (Iqbal, 1986, p. 39) depending on one's take on the concerned Qur'anic interpretations and hadiths. It is important to note that the selection or election is done through the judgment of the jurists, scholars, and ulama on the basis that the chosen one is competent and expected to rule according to Shari'ah.

The juridical authority of the leader, especially the caliph, serves as a political symbol in unifying the ummah, but as the Muslim polity evolves, the basis for this ideological unity is no longer attainable (Ayubi et al., 2009). As the Abbasids declined in the 12th century, the role of the caliph bifurcated into separate realms of the sacred and secular (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, pp. 46–47). In addition, the prominent source of legitimate authority became a security issue that referred to the lesser jihad or defending Muslim territories from Crusaders, Mongols, and other foreign invaders. Moreover, the Shi'ite peoples' non-recognition of a caliph as heir of the Prophet and their belief in occultation (Belkeziz, 2009, pp. 50–52) symbiotically coexisted with the Persian-style kingship and sultanate systems as temporal rule (Arjomand, 1988, p. 4). Ayatollah Khomeini's Vilayat-i Faqih (or rule or guardianship by jurists) later became the central body of contemporary Shi'a political thought (Arjomand, 1988, p. 3), controlled by a guardianship-based political system while recognizing the absence of an infallible 12th Imam (Vaezi, 2004, p. 53).

In the modern period and after the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, political authority broke into three types: monarchical, dictatorial, and semi-democratic (Khan, 2014a, p.

520). The power of the *ulama* weakened with the adoption of the modern nation-state system and was divided into two categories: the official ulama and the non-official (independent) (Akbarzadeh & Saeed, 2003, p. 14). The official *ulama* (Zaman, 2009, pp. 226–229) are part of the state bureaucracy, while the non-official are (financially and politically) independent of state control. The non-official ulama are relatively small in numbers, and, at times, the state manages to penetrate their leadership. The nation-state took almost all the powers of the *ulama* and curtailed their influence among the people.

The only role left for the *ulama* was administering local family laws, and yet this still fell under the civil law and the supremacy of the state's constitution. Even trainings, tools (such as manuals and technical books), salaries, and proficiency degree programs to become a member of the *ulama* were directly supervised by the state (Akbarzadeh & Saeed, 2003, p. 23). In addition, permits to build and manage mosques were also taken over by the state. Moreover, crisis in the authority of ulama may also be attributed to and caused by them as well. There have been increasing numbers of *ulama* preferring to study Islam in Western institutions such as Oxford and Cambridge, rather than in their own madrasas or universities; thus, most of them have rejected past scholarship of their own traditions. They also halted person-to-person (oral) transmission of knowledge by printing and translating Islamic sources from Arabic to various vernacular languages (Zaman, 2009, pp. 221–222). Consequently, according to Robinson (2009, pp. 345–348), "they themselves began to destroy the 'closed shop' which gave them the monopoly over transmission and interpretation of knowledge."

Numerous scholars have discussed what form/s of political authority or government is/are appropriate for the Muslim world in the postcolonial age. Rashid Rida (b. 1865, d. 1935) argued for the necessity of a caliphate that will cater to a balance of the worldly and religious interests of the Muslim world (Black, 2001, pp. 325–326). He likened the caliph to the Catholic papacy, serving as a model for emulation. This was refuted by Shaykh 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (b. 1888, d. 1966), who contended that Islam did not prescribe a system of government and that there is no mention in the Qur'an regarding a preferred political system for the ummah ((Black, 2001, p. 330). Even the Prophet did not elaborate any particular polity or provide instruction on ways and criteria in

choosing a leader. All his political and diplomatic actions were means to propagate Islam. For al-Raziq, the caliphate was a product of a historical moment catering to political needs, and Shari'ah could also be changed because it was also influenced by specific historical circumstances. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im (b. 1946) argues that Shari'ah principles could not be imposed by the state (Black, 2001, p. 336). He is in favor of a secular society where different groups of peoples or communities share equally the same political space.

Territoriality

The *ummah* is also essential to an understanding of territoriality. As Derrick (2013, p. 2) points out, it has various synonyms, interpretations, and understandings among Muslim scholars, depending on the context of its usage in the Qur'an. It may mean Muhammad's closest followers, encompassing all living creatures, a mother (in Arabic), a community (in Sumerian, Aramaic, or Hebrew), or a unified Muslim world (in modern discourse) (Mandaville, 2001). In some respects, al-Farabi (b. 872, d. 950) referred to it as the gathering of tribes or clans or the structure of a city. He also considered Indians, Abyssinians, Persians, Egyptians, and Syrians as another ummah and differentiated it with the term *milla* (which may mean a way, path, or cult under a divine ruler with a set of views and deeds), because ummah rules the entire life of a certain community, including its physical character, natural traits, and common tongue (Ayubi, 1991, p. 19).

The first historical record of an established *ummah* was when the Prophet Muhammad became the leader of different communities composed of Muslims, Jews, Pagans, and Christians in Medina, cemented by an agreed treaty or charter stipulating articles of collective security. According to Mandaville (2001, p. 36), "this 'treaty' provided an overarching sense of authority for the anarchic settlement. Because it demanded complete loyalty from all factions it also effectively prevented the formation of unstable alliances between clans." Muhammad's ability to demand commitment from all warring factions of Medinan society made him an able and efficient political authority. This is because his previous successes in wars against the settlers of Mecca had put him on a pedestal, and neighboring nomadic tribes

relied on and pledged allegiance to him due to his skillful leadership (Davutoglu, 1994). Thus, the *ummah* of Medina may be described as a conglomerate of numerous communities—be they tribal, confessional, or confederate in nature. The contemporary *ummah* is represented as an imagined politico-religious community patterned and based on the paradigmatic experience of Muhammad's Medinan society (Jabareen, 2015, p. 53).

This type of ummah is envisioned by Islamists (political parties in Muslim states) and jihadists (transnational terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS) with the aspiration of recreating and reviving it in today's world to counter the hegemony of the nation-state system. However, most Islamists have come to accept the current political configuration of their states. Within the *ummah*, there is a kind of polity mentioned in the Qur'an called *dawlah* (usually representing the state or country in the modern sense). According to Ayubi et al. (2009), the original meaning of *dawlah* as used in the medieval era connotes "to turn, rotate, or alternate" (Ayubi et al., 2009). It was even used to describe fortunes, vicissitudes, or dynasty during the Abbasid period. It was only then that it became territorial rather than communal, mainly because of the study done by al-Ṭahtawi (b. 1801, d. 1873), who presented the idea of watan or fatherland (Sawaie, 2000). The first time the word *dawlah* appeared to mean "state" was in the Turkish memorandum of 1837 (Ayubi et al., 2009).

Territory is "dar" in Islamic legal terminology, and etymologically it means "house" (Bouzenita, 2012, p. 192). It is synonymous with the term *mawdhi* (place), *balad* (land), or *watan* (home or place of residence) (Bsoul, 2007, p. 74). The concept evolved through its interrelatedness with the political and legal dominance of the ruler over his jurisdiction. The *dar* was structured as a legal framework in order to distinguish the Muslim political order from the rest of the world (Ayoub, 2012, p. 2). In Qur'anic terms, it is used to describe a place of residence, final abode, or simply a house. Moreover, it is also a specific territory where the ruling regime and its subjects are Muslims. This sense could be attained if any of the four cases was upheld: "(1) the residents of a territory converted to becoming Muslims; (2) the territory is captured by force but the government allows the Muslims to practice and enforce their Islamic rulings; (3) the non-Muslim residents accept Islamic law under the Muslim protection;

and (4) if the territory is conquered through a peaceful agreement where Muslims are allowed to settle and implement land tax" (Ayoub, 2012, p. 84).

In classical Sunni jurisprudence, the *dar* is basically classified into two divisions: *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam or peace) and *dar al-Harb* (the abode of war or the enemy). These are not Qur'anic terminologies but jurists' interpretations that emerged in the middle of the 8th century (the second century in the history of Islamic civilization). Ayoub (2012) argues that it was the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet including its hadiths or sayings)—and not the Qur'an—that played an essential role in developing these two categories. He further states that "in their efforts to synthesize this theory, most jurists projected their legal reasoning upon two major events in Muslim history" (Ayoub, 2012, pp. 7–10). First, they relied upon the event of the migration (hijra) from Mecca to Medina in 622. Second, many of their legal determinations were inspired by the conquest of Mecca in 630 (Ayoub, 2012, p. 13). These theoretical divisions became so resounding that most Sunni jurists have accepted them uncritically, especially during the 1255 Mongolian invasion (and even after the last Crusaders were defeated in 1187) of most Muslim lands. Thus, scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (b. 1263, d. 1328) have adopted it in their works, which are very much cited by both contemporary Islamists and jihadists alike (Bori, 2009).

Dar al-Islam is a legal construct that has a territorial dimension where Islamic law prevails and, to some extent, a political expression of the ummah is present. In short, it is a politico- territorial manifestation of the Muslim community (Parvin and Sommer, 1980, p. 5). This concept has pre-Islamic roots, notably, nomadism (non-sedentary lifeways) and urbanism (non-rural lifeways). This is embodied in Mecca as a religious sanctuary and Medina as the first Islamic state that functioned as the center of trade and commerce during that time. Moreover, it is based on a concept of individual allegiance to the universal Islamic message. Most jurists believed that even if a majority of the people are non-Muslims or nonbelievers, as long as the dominant laws follow Shari'ah, then it is still the abode of Islam.

Dar al-Harb is also a legal construct that has a territorial dimension, but it denotes a realm that is politically or economically subjugated by a non-Muslim power. According to Iqbal (1986, p.

37), "Muslims would be left with only two alternatives: either to conduct jihad (struggle) in order to regain their independent status, or to migrate to some Muslim country." It is quite important to understand fully this division, because some jurists, especially the Hanafis (one of the surviving schools of Sunni jurisprudence), contend that even if the majority of the population are Muslims but the laws and security are governed by kufr (nonbelievers or infidels), then it is still the abode of the enemy of Islam (Ayoub, 2012). Shafi'i coined a third division, the *dar al- Sulh* (territory of friendly non-Muslim nations) or *dar al-Ahd* (land of temporary truce) (Ayoub, 2012, p. 4), where a Muslim territory has diplomatic relations with non-Muslim territories in order to protect the lives and property of both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities in both areas, in exchange for paying (or receiving) tribute (Bouzenita, 2012, p. 193). It signifies that Muslim minorities are free to practice their religion even if they are ruled (not protected) by a non-Muslim leader. However, some jurists think that even if there is an armistice concluded between the rulers, this division still forms part of the *dar al-Harb*. Bouzenita (2012, p. 193) argues that this division is not an entirely independent territorial one, because it relies on the conditions of the contract at hand.

Out of all the Sunni schools of jurisprudence (fiqh), the Hanafis mostly focused on the study of territoriality, developing a legal concept called *ikhtilaf al-darayn* (translated in English as "territoriality" as well). The founder, Abu Hanifa (b. 699, d. 767), emphasized that the core factors in declaring a place as the abode of Islam or of war/the enemy are security (aman), fear, and absence of protection (isma). The Hanafis viewed Muslims and non-Muslims as "two independent legal characters, each having its legal status" (Ayoub, 2012, p. 5), where religion is not a determining factor in the legal structure of territoriality.

According to Ayoub (2012, p. 2), there are three main factors in Hanafi's concept of territoriality: "(1) residency; (2) legal status of the individuals; (3) the existence of al-man`a (secured jurisdiction)." The applicability of his territorial concept rests in two conditions: "(1) the disparity of the legal and physical proximity of two jurisdictions; and (2) the absence of inviolability or protection for people's life or property" (Ayoub, 2012, p. 5). However, despite Hanafi's insistence on the personal legal status of peoples within the divisions of *dar*, Abou El Fadl argued that "all Muslims belong to a single community (umma wahida) regardless of their

residence" (Ayoub, 2012, p. 3). In turn, he claimed that Hanafis were preoccupied with territorial and jurisdictional intricacies, rather than engaging in moral obligations.

It is important to note that Islamic territoriality is a result of the historical evolution of Muslim governance and the legal conceptualizations of jurists, that is, from Medinan society, the caliphate, and empires to the adoption of postcolonial polities (nation-states). In the 9th century, al-Muqadassi (b. 946, d. 991) distinguished between the cultural regions of Arabs and Persians (Parvin & Sommer, 1980, p. 11). The Hudud al-Alam (Regions of the World, 983), a 10th- century geographical book, contained 51 nations divided into provinces and towns. But among the perennial social elements that bind nations, as argued by Ibn Khaldun (2015), is *asabiyyah* (usually translated as solidarity). Parvin and Sommer (1980, p. 13) point out that through solidarity, people tended to acquire landed property in order to maintain political and economic security. By the 16th century, competition in amassing lands became fiercer because of the dominance of strong empires such as the Mughals (South Asia), the Safavids (Persia), and the Ottomans (presently Turkey).

However, with the arrival of the European colonialists and the imposition of the idea of permanent territorial borders, *dar al-Islam* gradually delegitimized the idea of the abode of Islam based on the history of Muslim civilization that had been characterized by its expansionist and occupationist tendencies, in contrast with the European colonial polity. In the face of threats of widespread European intervention into Muslim lands during the 19th century, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (b. 1838, d. 1897) proposed to the then caliphal ruler, Sultan Abdulhamid, a return to the pristine message of unity in a single Muslim ummah in order to restore universal solidarity (Derrick, 2013, p. 14). Derrick (2013) addresses how Muslim thought about territoriality, *dar al-harb* and *dar al-Islam*, similar to al-Afghani's conceptualization of ummah as an emulation of the German idea of a nation, which could be achieved through a confederation of Muslim states.

Mauriello and Marandi (2016) and Abdel Haleem (2008) discuss the Shi'a reaction to European colonialism. The Shi'a version of *dar* is not represented by the *dar al-Islam* or *dar al- Harb* but by the mustad'afun (oppressed) and mustakbirun (oppressor) world views (Mauriello and Marandi, 2016, p. 4). Shi'a scholars

argue for the "oppressed–oppressor" dualism of *dar* in Qur'anic terms (notably 4:75, 97–98, 127 and 8:26) (Abdel Haleem, 2008), compared with the Sunni conception of territorial division, which was a result of 8th-century juristic interpretation by the Hanafis. However, there is no clear explanation of whether the Shi'a version of abodes of Islam and of the enemy, as represented by the oppressed–oppressor duality, is territorial in nature. According to Mauriello and Marandi (2016, p. 16), the Shi'a world view is more concerned with justice, corruption, and knowledge than with formal categorization of the territory.

In contemporary Iran, the late Khomeini described the Shi'a society in terms of two antagonistic components (aside from the oppressed–oppressor dualism of dar): oppressed nations (mellat-e mostad'af) versus Satan's government (hokumat-e sheitan), slum dwellers (zagheh- neshin-ha) versus palace dwellers (kakh-neshinha), poor (foqaha) versus rich (servatmandan), and the lower (tabaqe-ye payin) and needy class (tabaqe-ye mostamdan) versus the aristocratic class (tabaqe-ye a'yan) (Mauriello & Marandi, 2016, p. 17). Furthermore, as it is anchored in sound Qur'anic language and Islamic epistemology (and ontology), this model of oppressed-oppressor has a distinctive Islamic legitimacy and authority. The legitimacy of an authority's jurisdiction over a territory is sacrosanct to God's sovereignty.

Salafi Orthodoxy

Salafīyah, widely misunderstood in both the Western and Muslim worlds, is a complex term denoting various conceptualizations especially when its philosophy is applied to practice. Salafis are not directly Wahhābis, especially the version espoused by al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh (Ali, 2016). Generally, it refers to someone or some group of people who devoutly emulate (sometimes confidently mimic) the first three Muslim generations (known as al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) in all of their lifeworld system, including beliefs, acts, norms, and ritual performances. Their aim is to purify Islam and cleanse its creed from unwanted and deviant alien influences accorded for over a millennium of corrupt Muslim societies (Al-Atawneh, 2010), particularly found in some theological interpretations of Māturīdīyah, Ashʿarī, and Muʿtazilah, excessive taqlīd (imitation) to past jurists,

hermeneutics of Muslim philosophers, heretical Ṣūfī practices, and their ultimate enemy: the apostate Shia Muslims.

Salafis hold extremely to their belief in the oneness of God (tawḥīd al-uluhiyya) and that Muslims who stray from this sacred belief (e.g., veneration of Ṣūfī saints or Shia imams) are considered shirk (polytheists) and kufr (disbelievers). They interpret the Qurʾān and sunnah literally. For instance, faith by heart alone is not enough to be a Muslim; it must exemplify with correct rituals and practices based from their reading of the prophet's sunnah and ḥadīth. They also believe in the absoluteness of Sharīʿah that must be applied in all sociopolitical systems of the entire ummah (community). Without the application of Sharīʿah (predominantly Ḥanbalī law), the entire society constitutes sinful unbelievers.

Middle Eastern Salafism in general, and the Saudi orthodoxy in particular, had entered the religious psyche of Filipino Muslims in the 1960s, carried by what many consider to be the massive material wealth of petro-dollars. The Middle Eastern Wahhābī version of Salafism in the Philippines appeared through scholarships offered to young men to study in their countries, funding the creation of Salafī mosques, madāris, and organizations, and supplying arms to Jihadi-Salafis (e.g., the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Abu Sayyaf Group, and several others). With the rise of such Saudi- or Middle Eastern–educated Filipino Muslims, traditional practices, norms, and folklores began to disappear. Customs such as commemorating the birth of the Prophet, musical expressions in singing and dancing, use of colorful traditional dress codes (e.g., women's right not to wear Arab-styled ḥijāb), use of traditional linguistics on Islamic holidays, use of prayer beads, saying of more than eleven prostrations in the tarāwīḥ prayers, and many others are being practiced less. Instead, influences such as Arabized (predominantly Saudi-styled) dress codes (e.g., the mandatory of wearing ḥijāb, niqāb, or burqa for women), culture, and lifestyle are considered to be manifestations of pure and true Islam (Lauzière, 2016).

The sanctity of familial community is disturbed by friction between traditional syncretic Islam (union of Moro's long-held customs and culture with Islam) and modernist Wahhābī–Salafī Islam and there is a gap between old-age traditional Muslims,

characterized by inter-civilizational and multicultural linkages, and that of exclusivist young-age Middle Eastern–trained Muslims, who describe a world of black and white (i.e., pure Muslims versus other Muslims and non-Muslims). This dichotomous worldview is exacerbated by Moro grievances with historical injustices and socioeconomic and political disenfranchisement from imperial Manila (Riviere, 2016). Due to poverty, lack of education, conflicts, insurgencies, political anomie, *rido* or clan wars, among other things, the Moro peoples are susceptible to frequent Wahhābī–Salafī hypnosis by material wealth, particularly from Gulf countries and privately rich Arab individuals or organizations.

The Salafī Filipino Muslims can be divided into two categories: the Silent-Salafis and the Jihadi- Salafis. The first category refers to adherents who are not politically vocal in the public sphere and uses proselytizing tools (e.g., the dawah movement) in various small communities to spread their ideology. It could be in the form of media (e.g., Mensahe TV based in Davao City; education (Almaarif Educational Center Inc. in Baguio City, private madāris, state-regulated madrasah, *toril* or boarding schools, various Markaz learning centers); the Balik-Islam movement made up generally of Filipino Christian converts to the Islamic faith that started between the 1980s and 1990s (most are overseas workers in the Middle East who had contacts with Wahhābī cells and received Salafī educational materials); higher education such as Islamic Studies programs at the University of the Philippines and Mindanao State University (beneficiaries of Saudi donations of Salafī educational materials); and NGOs such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the Muslim World League.

Some representative groups include Daʿwatus-Salafiyyah Philippines, Salafi Media Philippines, and Nida-ul Islam Foundation Inc., based in Zamboanga City. The Daʿwatus-Salafiyyah Philippines, mainly comprised of Tausugs, have publicly presented their identity in some of the following tenets of their beliefs: oneness of God with other forms considered polytheism; love of the Prophet's Companions and family; love of the People of Ḥadīth and all salaf; and despising of theological and philosophical knowledge systems because they are viewed as the cause of Muslims' fragmentation; non-acceptance of any books on *fiqh* (jurisprudence), on *tafsīr* (Qurʾānic commentaries), or historical academic books; shirk, apostasy, and that non-

practicing Muslims are great sinners punishable by expulsion; politics is congruently part of Islam and they are mutually inclusive.

An antecedent to the second category of Salafī Filipino Muslims is the unique locally based Balik-Islam movement. Its members do not want to be called "converts"; they instead prefer to be called "returnees" or "reverts" to Islam. They believe that the original religion of the Philippines is Islam, and that their Christian identity is a product of historical accident over which they had no control (Lacar, 2001). The RSM is one of the extreme Balik-Islam groups, founded by Hilarion Santos III (aka Ahmed or Lakay), which wanted to impose Sharīʿah and eliminate Philippine secular laws.

The RSM is an example of a Salafī Jihadist group whose aim is to wage continuous violent jihad until they achieve a pure Islamic society. Jihadi-Salafis, mostly influenced by the writings of Sayyid Quṭb, promoted war against apostate rulers and saw this actuation as a divine obligation. The founder of the RSM has no formal training in Islamic studies. He was an overseas worker in Saudi Arabia who converted to Islam in 1992 and returned a year later to the Philippines in order to propagate his version of Islam. This is a similar method and approach used by Filipino Muslims and converts who, upon return to their country and local communities, immediately joined several dawah movements. These self-proclaimed Islamic intellectuals, who received some favorable response from Muslim communities, have no formal scholarly training in Islamic education.

Another Jihadi-Salafi exemplar is Aburajak Janjalani, the founder of the ASG, who went to Saudi Arabia in 1981 to study Islamic jurisprudence and immersed himself in jihadī thinking and literature (Ramakrishna, 2018). After coming back to the Philippines, he recruited similarly minded Salafī individuals who had studied in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Libya to form the ASG and to advance its desire to counter MILF hegemony and imperial Manila's Christian secularism. It is worthy to note that most of the Salafī educational institutions in the country (e.g., Darul Imam Shafii) are well-funded by Saudi- based organizations including, surprisingly, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) (Abuza, 2003). The extent of financing networks commenced during the Afghan war, where more than a

thousand of Filipino Muslims sent by the MILF were trained and indoctrinated (Mendoza, 2010). It is no wonder that the recent bombings in Mindanao and the Marawi crisis are manifestations of an increasing number of adherents to the Jihadi-Salafi version of Islam (Kumar, 2018).

Despite the incompatibility between Middle Eastern Islam and Southeast Asian Islam, it was the poor economic conditions and conflicts in Muslim-dominated regions of the Philippines that laid for the groundwork for a speedy conversion of Filipino Muslims to Wahhābī Salafīyah. Thus, the link between Middle Eastern Salafism, particularly of Saudi orthodoxy is the strongest Salafī representation in the country.

Bangsamoro Governance

Muslim missionaries, mostly *sufis* (mystics) from South Asia, arrived in the southern Philippines in 13th century and started spreading the message of Islam. Muslim traders have also reached Philippine islands via monsoon winds in 14th century where some businessmen married the locals. The locals who accepted Islam were later known as the Bangsamoro (literally means the nation of the Moro people) in contemporary 21st century Philippines. Etymologically, the word Moro was derived from the term 'Moor', which the Spanish rulers in colonial Philippines used it to refer to Muslims in Southern Spain, the al-Andalus. Spanish efforts to subjugate the Moro homeland resulted in the Spanish-Moro wars that began in 1565 and lasted for over 300 years (Kamlian 2012). The Moro communities are composed of 13 major ethno-linguistic communities located in the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. These are the Badjao, Iranun, Jama Mapun, Ka'agan, Kalibugan, Magindanaon, Maranao, Molbog, Palawani,Sama, Sangil, Tao-Sug, and Yakan (Lingga 2002). There are also Muslims among the other indigenous peoples of Mindanao like the Teduray, Manobo, Bla-an, Higaonon, Subanen, T'boli, and others. In recent years, significant numbers of people from Luzon and the Visayas islands, as well as migrant communities in Mindanao, have converted to Islam (Hussain 2012).

Due to historical injustices and economic negligence caused by the Philippine government, including the corrupt Moro

elites themselves, towards the ordinary Moro peoples, rebellion ensued with the formation of two Muslim armed separatist groups: the MNLF and the MILF, an offshoot of MNLF. The latter group (MILF) had succeeded its negotiations with the Philippine government to form the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in 2019. It replaced the 1989 ARMM with an asymmetrical power with the Republic of the Philippines in parliamentary setting. Ideally, authority in Islam is supernatural-bounded and divinely-constructed but its operationalization depends on interpretations of religious elites of scholars (ulama) and jurists mostly crafted through the process of consensus (ijma) basing from the established (Sunnah) practices or traditions created by the Prophet, and laid down to his companions to generations.

The Qur'an possessed supreme authority over all written human laws which also complement the Sunnah. Thus, it is universal and cannot be altered or modified. However, Shari'ah (legislated laws of the jurists) could be modified (added, omit or alter) depending on the exigencies of changing times. The idea that Philippine sate monopolize violence is equivalent to Islam's monopoly of moral order under the dictum of 'commands good and forbids evil'. Territoriality is loosely conceptualized as *ummah* that has physical aspects, cultural traits and lingua franca. Within *ummah* polities (*dawlah* or state) emerged and it evolved historically into *watan* (fatherland, which expresses the link between group of peoples and specific geographical location). The Islamic term for *watan*, land, place, house or abode is called '*dar*', where in 8th century juristic interpretation two abodes were created, the abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the abode of war/enemy (*dar al-Harb*). There are also several contested abodes such as abode of truce, agreement, treaty or of friendly nations whereby Muslims are minority in non-Muslim regimes.

However, the idea of territorial sovereignty is gradually being recognized by contemporary Islamic scholarship as a result of historical conditions that something Islam recognizes it as a reality. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in reality, operates and configured within the confines of nation-state system as opposed to the Islamic *dar* or Hanafi's *ikhtilaf al-darayn* (i.e., territoriality). The territoriality of BARMM postulates contiguous borders which are legally imposed and adjudicated, for instance, Muslim governance are adjudicated by juristic division of realms

or abodes of Islam and of war/enemy including certain period of truce or peace treaty and its politico-territorial unit of analysis (the *ummah*). Moreover, this also includes Hanafi's study of territoriality on the bases of security, fear, existential threat, protection, and the independent legal status of the peoples comprising the whole territory. On the other hand, it is different with the Shi'a version of territoriality (i.e. *mustad'afun*/*mustakbirun* paradigm) referring to Quranic revelations and their understanding of the message of God, which explicitly manifests justice, knowledge, and prevention of corruption. Thus, the shi'a version is vague and unclear whether it connotes territoriality or not.

The reconfiguration of the political arrangement or system within the Muslim society in the guise of the recently formed BARMM system entails the following residuals:

1) The establishment of a new Bangsamoro political entity with its own structure of government (i.e., parliamentary form) supervised by the Philippines' presidential form of government.

2) The relationship between the National and Bangsamoro governments shall be asymmetric.

3) All issues that may result in a dispute between the National and Bangsamoro governments shall be resolved by an intergovernmental relations mechanism. The nature of powers between these two governments will have reserved, concurrent, and exclusive powers.

- *Reserved powers* are matters over which authority and jurisdiction are exercised by the National Government.
- *Concurrent powers* refer to the powers shared between the National Government and the Bangsamoro Government.
- *Exclusive powers* are matters over which authority and jurisdiction pertain to the Bangsamoro Government only.

4) Whatever power the Bangsamoro may exercise over its territory, it must be consistent with and not

contravening to the country's international obligations and commitments.

5) The Bangsamoro Government's treasury power is exercised through the development of Islamic Banking.

6) Under the explicit language of the BOL, the Shari'ah law shall have application over Muslims only. The national justice system will remain intact for all matters outside the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts, and the inherent power of judicial review by the Supreme Court (to review any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Shari'ah Court) under the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

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