Month: January 2011

Essays on English School of International Relations: Hedley Bull (4 of 7)

I will answer one of the posited questions stated in the course outline, this is “to what extent does Bull’s conception of international society comply with the contemporary international relations?” The question gives me an impression of (un)certain putative degree or level about the compliance of Bull’s international society to the current milieu of international relations. We should first analyze what is the definition of international society for Hedley Bull[i]. He defined it “when a group of states conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”[ii] This is different when he meant for system of states which according to him is “formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.”[iii] I would also add from Dr. Yurdusev lecture that a system is when a state takes into consideration of the other state – be they existence, actions, or recognitions.
     It is difficult to decipher if Bull’s conception of international society complies or not to the contemporary (practice of) international relations or to what extent it comply because of the tensions and contradictions purported by Bull himself. Though I would contend that he is finding a middle way between realism and cosmopolitanism. Bull’s argued that there were universal goals of social life, that are, to secure life from violence, to ensure promises will be kept and to ensure that the possession of things will remain stable, these goals set the primary goals of international society. These were preservation of the system and of the society of states itself, maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, maintaining peace (or peace in the absence of war), limitation of violence, keeping of promises, and rules of property.[iv]
     If these were the goals then what are the courses or operationalizations to attain the goals of an international society? Bull did not give a direct bulleted courses or operations to attain the goals of his conception on international society instead he laid down functions of integral components of the contemporary international system. Functions of balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great powers were outlined in the book “The Anarchical Society.” I do not think that these functions can help me sort out if his international society complies with the contemporary international relations. Detailing the functions or even redefining the elements that composes the international society to fit to what he has conceptualized does not mean that it can be relegated as operations or courses for states to achieve an international society. Thus I would argue that these are just guidelines for states and not instructions imposed unto them. It is still within the prerogative of the state whether she will comply with the guidelines set by Hedley Bull. With this I mean that a scholar is making suggestions on what courses of actions should a state undertake, and not the other way around where a scholar is part of the government mission or an advisor like Henry Kissinger et al. This is still much debatable whether the advancement of scholarship or learning of a scholar should be utilized by the government in order to color a certain political agenda.
     Let us now analyze Bull’s definition of international society concomitant to what extent does it complies with the contemporary international relations. By this I meant the practice of international relations and not the discipline itself. He started the definition with ‘when a group of states conscious of certain common interests and common values’: my question here is how can you instill or trigger consciousness to a group of people (this also bothers me about what does he mean by a group of people – is it with common culture, language, traditions, norms and/or ethnical, racial or religious bounded) is it by following a certain identical pattern(s) of ideology(ies) or belief(s) or a lineage or pedigree of sense of belongingness to one’s own values and interests. The certainty of common interests and common values is to me an uncertain panacea. The second predicate of his definition is to ‘form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’; existing consciousness of certain common values and interests does not necessarily lead them to form a society which is bounded by set of rules and institutions. There will always be pressures, conflicts and clashes among a group of people in every trajectory or projection of how they see themselves and how they see (perceive) the world.
     The only thing (if I could use this term) that I can see nearer to but not epitomizes his conception of international society is the European Union (EU) while all other regional and international organizations are far or have not committed nor complied to the standard of his international society. Even inside EU we cannot avoid the fact that there are pathologies (vulnerabilities and weaknesses) and parochial interests besetting the organization. From the parochial interests of different subgroups, rationality of individual actors to the striving sectional interests groups contributed to the intrinsic complexity of the society. When the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, did this country even acknowledged a little bit or sense of Bull’s idea. If I remember it correctly, it was in the lecture of Dr. Yurdusev that he said: “Bull’s last article condemned the two great powers, the US and Russia, for their horrendous irresponsibility which escalated a chaotic world and did not care about the plight of the third world.” Furthermore, his thesis is inapplicable to Middle East which was highly and deeply penetrated region from different interests of major powers in the world since the inception of the first (alternative) Middle East state.
     You cannot even rely to the attainments of his goals for an international society when even states killed its own citizens, look what happened in Rwanda, in Bosnia (Srebrenica) and now in Darfur, Sudan. How about the distinct varied cultures of Asia, South America and Africa that don’t want to be subdued to Western values? The Palestinian, Chechen, Kurdish and Moro (Southern Philippines) problems, questions in the Basque, Kuriles, Cyprus, Kashmir, Spratly and Sabah territories and low politics issue areas, e.g., environmental challenges (climate change, global warming, deforestation, desertification and toxic wastes), energy/water crisis, rapid population ageing, refugees/internally displaced persons, transnational crimes (human trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, piracy, and small arms smuggling), food security (GMOs or Genetically Modified Organisms), and weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and radiological weapons). These are just some, if not all, burdens that the contemporary international relations encounter. So I am not shock if one day there will be World War III but hopefully all the means and ways must be done to prevent this catastrophic event.  

[i] There is one good source, a tribute to Hedley Bull about his life and ideas before he died. The book is so concise yet presents a comprehensive accounts and details of his world view and schema but of course with critical perspectives from the authors. This is the edited book of J.D.B. Miller and R.J. Vincent’s “Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
[ii] Hedley Bull, “The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 13)
[iii] ibid, p. 9.

[iv] Another online source that reviewed the book can be found here.

Essays on English School of International Relations: Martin Wight (3 of 7)

For this essay we will try to explore the idea of Martin Wight’s contribution on the theory of International Relations[i], then personal thoughts and critique will follow or it could be stated after his ideas were presented. In his essay ‘Why is there no international theory?[ii]’ was regarded as a classical piece that most of the theorist[iii] of international relations cited him as a godfather (well, there is no appropriate adjective to describe him instead I used the word that Dr. Yurdusev said in his lecture, though a different meaning was presented, i.e. Wight occupies a godfather figure in the school) in an attempt to understand and establish the conception of international theory. Such word like international theory can also be interpreted in different contextual of social sciences, hitherto sociology, political science and its subdisciplines, law and even philosophy. Social theory can be part of international theory, but international theory is more likely paralleled with political theory.
     Wight argued that the sense of international theory traditionally is “imagined as the twin of speculation about state to which the name political theory is appropriated” but he clearly elaborated that any layman (I assume those who were educated but not necessarily ordinary people that in a sense they constitute the lower class in the society, if we mean economics here – the poor and in general, those who did not finish or enter tertiary level of education) might comprehend it as to which “some conceptual system which offers a unified explanation of international phenomena.” This is not to discredit a layman’s comprehension but I don’t think every one of them can think and explain it within the borders of language and meaning that Wight described and defined.
     He is bewildered when proponents of international theory regard, somehow, Machiavelli, Kant, Rosseau et al as founding fathers when they have been understood as classical writers and philosophers of political theory. Moreover, Thucydides was even anointed (this word was taken just to exaggerate how realists want to back-up their claim that realism was part of the classical strand of history of political thought) as the founder of classical realism because of his written stories or documentation on the Peloponnesian war and the Melian dialogue between the powerful Athenians and the citizens of the small island called Melos. This premise is not that troubling nor causes bewilderment because every fields and disciplines in social sciences share a bond of interrelatedness and conceptual correlations. Like I remember, Prof. Carlos, my teacher in one of my master course in the Philippines, consider Philosophy as the mother of all sciences while Prof. Espiritu, my adviser in one of my undergraduate course, regarded History as the foot or base of all sciences. These anecdotal quotations need not be elaborated for common sense dictates that any notions, conceptions with inclusion of their ontological propositions and epistemological presuppositions and ideologies precipitate a multidisciplinary approach in social science.
     Wight asked a resounding inquiry: What international theory was there before 1914? And if there was any, is it worth rediscovering? He straightforwardly answer this question stating that “if political theory is the tradition of speculation about the state, then international theory may be supposed to be a tradition of speculation about society of states … or of the international community.” But he believed that international theory was marked by two reasons: (1) intellectual prejudice imposed by sovereign state and (2) the belief in progress. The idea of sovereignty alone contributed to the lack of empirical or historical research of international theory. When sovereignty was imposed and served as a cardinal stance among all over the world, community of people aspired, forcefully or gradually, for state and that recognition of their sanctified (sacred) sovereignty must be respected for they will also respect others. The sovereign nation-state became the dominant actor in international relations and was associated with political theory for a long time before World War I.
     Another constraining element or factor to the development of international theory is the belief of progress. He followed the idea of Toynbee by rejecting the belief on progress. For example, he referred the conceptions of nationalism and nation-states as modern reincarnation of tribalism, which in turn, resulted to the poverty of international theory. His attempt on deepening the understanding on why is there no international theory was quite lackluster for he did not present or recommend any (putative) solutions or criteria on how and what should be an international theory. However, I am not saying that this was not a form of precedence for scholars to imagine and think regarding the placement of the theory of the British School of International Relations in the field rather it served as an impetus and driving force to deepen and widen the conception of those who followed his footsteps. In trying to answer his article’s title, I think it is imperative to show how theory originated and formulated.
     We should first understand that in order to form/formulate one’s own theory we should first be concern if this has an ‘explanatory power’ in explaining a specific not a complex phenomenon; if you are debunking another theory then your explanatory power must be better. Description for me is I think the first stage in formulating a theory, how you describe and observe is the initial process for it is where you will ask, ask, and ask of many vague descriptions happening in a certain phenomenon. Then, reducing the questions into its one primal significance and salient characteristic consonance to the phenomenon. The second stage is interpretation, it is where you will find (plausible or even implausible) answers, gather all the answers you need and test all those answers for whatever methods or means you may want to use. The last stage is setting out your explanation by reinterpreting all of the plausible answers and select what you think is the most and highly feasible answer you had tested.
     If only he had answered his title by looking into the autonomous attribute of international theory then he may find (some) answers. This is one of the debacle or obstacle Kenneth Waltz encountered in writing his book the ‘Theory of International Politics’, making international politics separate, autonomous or independent from political science. He looked into, if I may adapt a scientific term, variable that will constitute an autonomous characterization. By this he meant the structure as the variable in analyzing the interactions between the units and the system and finding answers from the field of economics which Morgenthau et al paid less attention because for them it is irrelevant in the study of politics among nations and states, which will constitute Waltz explanatory power.
     This is not to discredit Wight’s essay vis-à-vis Waltz criterion for theory because what Waltz had done in his book is very positivistic which uses scientific method in determining a theory of international politics as against to one of the traditional roots of British School of International Relations which is adherence to methodological pluralism and rejection to behaviorism and Scientism.

[i] It is important to note that when I say International Relations (begins with capital letters), I refer to the discipline itself, however for small caps it is the practice of IR. Examples for the practice of international relations were diplomacy or state craft, consular, drafting treatises and other bilateral relationship on the state level.
[ii] One of the articles included in the first chapter of the Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (1966). Slanted phrases were directly extracted from that essay and I think it is unnecessary to cite pages (over again) because those were randomly cited and used.  
[iii] Citations can be found from the works of Yale Ferguson, Richard Mansbanch, Fred Chernoff and Mark Neufeld. It is interesting that these theorists were contemporary authors in IR and yet Wight has impacted their way of thinking but I would not assume that their scholarship was greatly influenced by Wight’s writings. 

Essays on English School of International Relations: Herbert Butterfield (2 of 7)

A short background about Herbert Butterfield was lectured by Dr. Yurdusev on 2 November 2009. According to him, Butterfield was a devout Wesleyan Methodist, son of a wool sorter/bookkeeper (father) and a domestic servant (mother), and the first boy from his hometown Oxenhope, located a few miles from the Lancashire-Yorkshire border in Australia. He fulfilled his father’s dream by becoming a lay preacher at an early age of 16 and received an Oxbridge scholarship from Cambridge University.[i]
     After publishing “The Whig Interpretation of History” in 1931 at a young age, he submitted an application for the Woodrow Wilson Chair at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and was placed on the short-list alongside C.A. Macartney, Arnold Forster and E.H. Carr. The selection committee, needless to say, appointed the latter. In spite of disappointment, his stay in Cambridge gave him prominence and administrative authority by becoming Master of Peterhouse (1955-68), Vice-Chancellor (1959-61) and Regius Professor (1965-68).[ii]
     His astonishing career is without a doubt, one of the greatest Western historians in 20th century. However, can we also assume and conclude that in line with the course objective, i.e. critically examine the works of the representative scholars identified with the school, H. Butterfield had greatly contributed to the development of the British theory of International Relations?[iii]  This essay will try to answer whether or not H. Butterfield’s works immensely and significantly contributed to the development and evolution of the British theory of International Relations?
     It is emphatic to disregard the origin of the school since he is the convener of it. But it is not right to say and claim that without H. Butterfield there will be no British theory of International Relations. Not all schools of thought and theory were founded and considered product of a single man (even he is brilliant); the flourishing essentials and growth of it is a byproduct of both intellectual collectivities among group of scholars and of their shared common views.
     Based on what I have read from articles, journals, scanned chapters of books and reviews about his works, I assumed that he was more concerned with the history of historiography and how historians should write, what he termed academic or technical history. Not by generalizing, analyzing and judging historical events but by telling the story and seeking to understand the past as it understood itself.[iv] Thus he is against of “Whig historians,” who practiced staging historiographical narratives anachronistically so as to produce a ratification of the present or justification of position exposed by them.[v] 
     Butterfield’s outlook was greatly influenced by St. Augustine and the traditions of Wesleyan Methodism. He believed that Providence had almost discernibly brought good out of evil, but goodness was never a character in the story the historian had to tell. The story of history, therefore, should teach humility and self-effacement.[vi] The order on which society rested was Providential, the gift of God, which produces a world in which men can live and gradually improve their external conditions, in spite of sin. He regarded the secularization of European society as a qualified good. Convinced of the ‘inner’ nature of religious faith, he held that Christians must come to God through their free will, not through outward conformity to the structure of ecclesiastical authority.[vii]
     In his article “Official History,” he distinguished two maxims for historians: (1) that governments try to press upon the historian the key to all the drawers but one, and are very anxious to spread the belief that this single one contains no secret of importance, (2) that if the historian can only find out the thing which government does not want him to know, he will lay his hand upon something that is likely to be significant.[viii]
     It is evident enough that historicity was the methodology employed and utilized by Butterfield in the study of international relations. He argued that it is best studied through diplomatic and general history, and must remain divorced from the world of practical politics. At a conference held in January 1949, in a characteristic statement of his view, he lamented the decline of diplomatic history in universities and attacked the rise of international relations. He complained, “only advanced training in diplomatic history and international law could provide students with a proper understanding of those relations.”[ix]
     In the committee he convened which was founded by Rockefeller Foundation, the group expressed greater concern with the historical than the contemporary, with normative than scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological and with principles than policy.[x] Most of his writings in the study of international relations were focused on the principles of prudence and moral obligation in the international society of states throughout its history. The role of providence in shaping the society is much of his concerned.
     In his contributions in the “Diplomatic Investigations,” he emphasized that international order is not a thing bestowed upon by nature, but is a matter of refined thought, careful contrivance and elaborate articles. Further, the principle of the balance-of-power apparently tended to the preservation of the status quo, putting a brake on territorial changes.[xi] Consequently, he sought a restoration of the ideas of a community of states, of the balance of power, of limited war, of restatement of the value of prudence and of the dangers of moralism.[xii] 
     In sum, Butterfield views on the study of international relations laid the foundational answers on some salient points of inquiry in theorizing International Politics. These are the question of roles of ethics and morality concomitant with Wesleyan Methodistic nature of providence in the international society of states, the importance of historicity against American’s ahistorical thinking of the field and the normative value of international order as a precondition of justice in formulating the British international politics.
     However, Butterfield’s scholarship on this endeavor was somehow a short-lived one because of his administrative duties in Cambridge and passion for historiography than publishing works in the field of international relations. Thus most, if not all, of international relations’ scholars were not so keen to his works and sometimes were highly critical of his scholarship with regards to theorizing international politics.
     I would argue in answering my posited question that Herbert Butterfield has, somehow, touched on some parts that he thinks are crucial in formulating a British theory of International Relations but in its entirety on the development and evolution, little or much less were contributed. Moreover, it is not that so sophisticated or grandeur as I would had expected from him, but full of slapdash and repetitive historical accounts which are insensitive to logical postulations and explanatory power that a theory requires.

[i] Taken from the first pages of Kenneth W. Thompson’s ‘Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth-Century Theorists and the World Crisis’ (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980) and Raymond Carr’s ‘Herbert Butterfield’, The Spectator, 23 October 2004.   
[ii] See Ian Hall, ‘History, Christianity and diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and international relations’, Review of International Studies, vol. 28 (2002), 727-728.
[iii] It was argued by Prof. Yurdusev that the school will be called ‘British’ instead of the common usage ‘English’ because it was placed and established based on ‘British tradition’ where the identified scholars were British or educated from British universities.
[iv] See Joseph Sobran, ‘The Wisdom of statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the philosophy of international politics’, National Review, 6 September 1985.
[v] See Keith C. Sewell, ‘The “Herbert Butterfield Problem” and its Resolution’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 64, no. 4 (Oct., 2003), 599.
[vi] Sobran’s article.
[vii] Hall, p. 725.
[viii] See Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr. (ed) The Politicization of Society (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979, p. 379).
[ix] Hall, p. 728.
[x] Thompson, p. 14.
[xi] See Herbert Butterfield’s Balance of Power in H. Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds) Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966).
[xii] Hall, p. 736.

Essays on English School of International Relations: Prologue (1 of 7)

To be honest I am not familiar of the tenets of the English School of International Relations nor its whole conception and repercussions with other theoretical schools in the field. Philippine universities with IR departments do not discuss British School of International Relations (BSIR) or worst is excluded in the curriculum. Probably because of the colonial effect that we were so Americanized in all aspects of living from culture, education, form of government and etc. Thus we adopted American IR from its ontology to its epistemology and hence every IR departments or any social science department has its own American studies. The only thing that I can recall is Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society which was one of the readings in my theory master course but still we did not discuss it extensively. That is why am so glad to have taken this course.
     As part of the course requirement which I must submit six essays about the six authors, I started with the convenor Herbert Butterfield which I did not like his writings concomitant with the development of BSIR. I discussed whether or not his works immensely and significantly contributed to the development and evolution of the BSIR? On Martin Wight’s case I explored the idea of his contribution on the theory of IR. For Hedley Bull I chose the question “to what extent does his conception of international society comply with the contemporary international relations.” In Adam Watson essay I discussed his new contribution on BSIR which is on ‘the practice of hegemony’, though this was not discussed in the class but I think it is imperative that we should also consider the changing or development of the mind’s author. On the other hand, I assessed the five different elements of Michael Donelan’s views on the nature of international politics. And lastly but not the least, I looked onto the notion of humanitarian intervention in contemporary world politics vis-à-vis R.J. Vincent’s argument about basic rights and humanitarian intervention.

Middle East?

The notion of the regional nomenclature of the term “Middle East” is somehow complicated when it applies as an area study or as a region itself. Even its origin of naming the region Middle East is a contestable issue. Who named it and in what purpose(s) does s/he have? What countries constitute Middle East or the Broader/Greater Middle East? Is there really a middle east in geographical sense? How does it differ from Near or Far East? Or is it geographically and politically correct to say, West Asia instead of Middle East? And what comprises the nature or characteristics of the area study of Middle East? 
     Whether how it was used or utilized by ordinary persons, scholars, or institutions remains a singular question that needs an answer for simple comprehension, i.e. how are we going to reach a common understanding about the term ‘Middle East’? However, it is difficult to dissect the intricacies of the term Middle East to reach a common understanding by those who contextually used it. The proponent asks one question related to this topic at academia.edu, his query was “why West Asia is called “Middle/Near East” same as other parts of Asia labeled as “Far East?” Why there is no Far, Middle or Near West?” 
     He thought and structured this question when most, if not all, scholars in Asia refers to the region West Asia and even termed their affiliated departments as West Asia, e.g. Philippines has Asian Center of the University of the Philippines which offers MA in Asian Studies with concentration on West Asia and in Jawaharlal Nehru University of India, the School of International Studies also offers M.Phil/Ph.D in West Asian and North African Studies and they even have Centre of West Asian Studies. In addition, Lionel Te-Chen Chiou, a sociology graduate student at Flinders University of South Australia opined that “in Chinese newspapers, you often see the term “Western Asia,” particularly in news coverage of football (soccer) matches and often see journalists from Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong use Western Asia.” 
     On the other hand, most scholars from Europe and America refer the region as Middle/Near East and use Middle/Near Eastern Studies or Oriental Studies in the affixation of their departments and degree programs. What is the geographical point of reference by Asian and European/American scholars when they refer to the region as West Asia and Middle East, respectively? Are there any differences and/or similarities in their ideological construction, underpinning meanings and supporting descriptions? How did the Orientalist construct this thought?
     The proponent received overwhelming and thought-provoking answers from his academia.edu colleagues. James Jumper, a graduate student at Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations of Harvard University, declared that “his field is a Euro-centric and terms like ‘near’ or ‘far’ has semi-cultural designation, that is they differentiate that China is decidedly different from Egypt, though the former is closer (in Europe’s eyes) to Japan.” Further, he stated that in contrast with the Orientalist perspective of terming Asian regions as Middle/Near/Far East which was motivated by classifying it as geographical-cultural groups, Westerners see themselves as more historically-culturally continuous.
     Waleed Mahdi of the University of Minnesota argued that the UN official designation is West Asia but problem arises when scholars think of the Greater Middle East because the term West Asia strategically excludes North African countries like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. He noted that an American geo-strategist Alfred Mahan popularized the term “Middle East” and to his understanding, the English have used the term Near East to refer to the Ottoman Empire and Middle East to refer to Persia.
     Ömür Harmanşah, a faculty member at Joukowsky Institute for Archaeology and the Ancient World of Brown University, provided a detailed answer though he thought that the question does not have a very straightforward answer. He said that it has something to do with the British colonialism in late 19th early 20th centuries, which greatly affected the geopolitics of imperialism in the Middle East. According to him, “In the social sciences today scholars who study medieval and modern periods use “Middle East” while those who study ancient Mesopotamia prefer ‘Near East’. Western Asia has been introduced as a geographical term that is relatively politically correct.” 
     He goes on by giving relevant articles to help find answers to the posited question. The following was his contribution:
Scheffler, Thomas; 2003. ” ‘Fertile crescent’, ‘Orient’, ‘Middle East’: the changing mental maps of Souhwest Asia,” European Review of History 10/2: 253-272.
“the invention of the ‘Middle East’ was not rooted in historical considerations but corresponded to the strategic needs of Western geopolitics. Backed by military power, institutions, and economic incentives, the concept became, however, a reality imposed upon and sometimes accepted by the region’s political actors.” (253)
     “In an article on ‘The Persian Gulf and International Relations’, published in 1902, the American navy captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), author of a much acclaimed study on The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), argued that the Russian advances in Central Asia and the projected German Berlin–Baghdad railway, might put Britain’s control of the maritime communication lines between Suez and India in jeopardy. Britain, Mahan argued, would be well advised to secure its control of the Persian Gulf region, a vaguely defined area he referred to as the Middle East: ‘The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will someday need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar…. The British Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force, if occasion arise, about Aden, India, and the Gulf.’56. Mahan’s term was almost immediately taken up and popularised” (264). 
     Consequently, what is your take on the notion of the term “Middle East”? How do you perceive or think the naming of Middle East as an area study and/or as a region?