Author: Nassef Manabilang Adiong

Constructivist scholars have systematically neglected the mechanisms of diffusion of religiously based non-Western norms in liberal settings. In recent decades the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has become an increasingly influential international actor through which Muslim-majority states channel their normative concerns in international society. In particular the OIC has become actively engaged in promoting international norms that challenge, often from an Islamic perspective, hegemonic secular liberal values embedded within the institutions of international society. The paper focuses on two norms that the OIC has attempted to promote within the United Nations (UN) since the 1990s. The first are “dialogue of civilizations” norms. These were successfully institutionalized in 2005, after gathering substantial backing from Western states, with a major UN initiative, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. The second are “religious defamation” norms. These, instead, were relentlessly opposed by Western states and led only to a minor and vague initiative largely outside the UN’s purview in 2011, the Istanbul Process. What explains these diverging results? The paper contends that religiously based non-Western norms have the greatest chances of being fully institutionalized within the UN, an international organization deeply embedded in and constitutive of the liberal international order, only when they can be effectively “translated” into secular liberal norms

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) helps to constitute boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that strengthen six states in the region, characterized by revisionist powers. By participants of the GCC it is viewed as an institution leading sub-region to the broader Arab unity. During the Gulf War 1990/91 participating states were not willing to resolve common, sub-regional problem, but they were looking for the help from non-Arab states. Processes of the regionalization help to generalize conditions or people within sub-regional boundaries speaking about Gulf policies, business, identity opposed to Arab spheres of activities. The GCC poses a forum of exchange of political views. But the GCC stands in front of challenges of the inclusion non-dynastic Yemen and post-Saddam Iraq which would have significant consequences for the security and economic fields of the sub-region. One of the problem of the organization is unfulfilled promises which damage credibility of the organization. This may poses real threat to the objectives of the GCC. The basic question I will try to find an answer to is: does the GCC guarantee security to its members in the broad sense or does the GCC member-states have to seek the security through bilateral agreements with external powers?

This paper analyzes four views on Muslim engagement in the United Nations: rejectionist, realist, Islamic-conservatives, and liberal. The rejectionist views the Muslim engagement with the UN as harmful to the Muslim cause because the UN rests on values such as state sovereignty, secularism, and cooperation incompatible with Islamic political values such as the umma, shari’ah, and dar-ul Islam versus dar-ul Harb. The realist also rejects the Muslim engagement with the UN not because of its incompatibility with Islamic values but because of the imbalance of power within the UN between the great powers and Muslim-majority states. Specifically, the American influence over the UN combined with the deep resentment of American politics towards the Muslim world prompts this group to be very cynical about the UN. The Islamic-conservative views the UN as a forum which can be utilized to demonstrate and defend the truth of Islam and to protect and promote Muslim interest by influencing its normative and political structure. The liberal perspective views the UN useful not just for serving to Muslim interests but for the common good of broader international community.

This presentation will demonstrate how the rise of political Islam in Turkey is understood by the mainstream academia and how Gramscian terminology (especially the integral state) would help us to illustrate power relations among neoliberal restructuring of the state within the state and civil society relations. Basically, existing literature on political Islam will be critically evaluated in this presentation. It would not be quite convenient to compare Turkey with other Islamic states because its own sui generis features such as its early and relatively high level of industrialisation, and its early but profound class contradictions and conflicts within it. Therefore this research will be primarily focussed on Turkish case and discussions among political Islam have been limited within the literature on Turkey in this research. The literature is separated into three basic subtitles as follows: state-centric approaches, society-centric approaches and institution-centric approaches. In the first one, there is an abstract assumption of strong state tradition which conflicts with civil society as if they are antagonistic entities. The second one accepts the strong state tradition as given, but there is more emphasis on civil society within identity-based issues. Finally, third one provides limited analysis of the fact since it is kept only within institutional level. The presentation will draw a Gramscian understanding of the state after the critical evaluation of mainstream approaches. In this context, it will be questioned that how the state and civil society relations should be considered in order to carry out a class-based analysis and how the rise of political Islam in Turkey should be comprehended within neoliberalism.

It has been widely debated whether the AKP and especially its leaders are ideologically driven. In this context, much has been written about how the writings of FM Davutoğlu, and the speeches of PM Erdoğan and President Gül, prove Turkey’s Islamic orientation and its leaders’ distinct perception of the West. Thus, although the AKP officially calls itself ‘conservative democrat’, many authors try either to prove the party’s ideological Islamist roots, or support its democratic character. To the end of contributing to this debate, this paper tries to answer two fundamental questions: what is the ideology of the AKP elite? To what extent does the AKP elite ideology influence Turkish foreign policy (TFP)? In answering the first question we first clarify whether there is an ideology or not; then, we make a distinction between the ideology of the AKP as a whole and the ideology of the policy-makers and officials, as expressed publicly. To examine the impact of ideology we empirically look at TFP towards Israel and Syria. The conclusion is that the AKP elite does have an ideology, based on political Islam; yet, its impact on foreign policy is limited as it is constrained by various material interests.

From the Welfare Party (WP) to the Justice and Development Party (JDP), foreign policies of Islamic parties have attracted disproportionate scrutiny. One of the focal points has been their approach to the West and Western-oriented institutions.  This article, based on Jack S. Levy’s concept of learning in foreign policy, is divided into periods to better show the evolution of foreign policy perspectives: the Welfare Party period, the Virtue Party in transition, and the first (2002 – 2006), second (2006 – 2010/11), and third (2011 – ) periods of JDP rule. I argue that from WP rule until the JDP’s first period in power, these parties’ approach to the West has been largely motivated by domestic considerations for different reasons. The WP defined the West as its Islamist identity’s “other” and sought to create an alternative framework; the JDP regarded the West as an instrument to gain legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. Yet, in its second term, the JDP attempted to balance its Western focused foreign policy with alternative complementary frameworks to achieve a more prominent international role. However, the JDP’s third term has been shaped by the Arab Spring and characterised by uncertainty about Turkey’s relations with the west. Hence, JDP rule has seen the emergence of a newly outward-facing political Islam in Turkey.

There is little doubt that Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s current Minister of Foreign Affairs of pro-Islamic AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), is the major driving force of Turkey’s ‘proactive and multi-dimensional’ foreign policy, even though the foundations for his regional foreign policy go back to 1980’s. Yet, it was Ahmet Davutoğlu who embedded this Ottoman reference into a reconsideration of the role of the West and of Turkey from a decidedly Islamic or intellectual-Islamist position. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, is also an academic of political science that has published several boks, and articles. Especially his book Strategic Depth is a very influential book in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. He is very influential in the military, academic, and government triangle shaping Turkish foreign policy. Professor Davutoğlu was granted a title of ambassador by the joint decision of President then Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister at that time Abdullah Gül in 2003. As an ambassador Davutoğlu was one of the leading actors on behalf of the Turkish government during the shuttle diplomacy for the settlement of 2008 Israel–Gaza conflict. In this paper I will scrutinize through his works how Davutoğlu as a scholar perceives the fields of Islam and international relations.

Is democracy a Western concept, inapplicable to other cultures? Are conceptions of democracy across the globe incongruous with one another? Such questions have long been debated but, more often than not, on rather abstract ideational, theological or philosophical levels. This paper complements these important discussions by focusing on concrete proposals by an Islamist political actor on how the term ‘democracy’ is understood. Specifically, the article draws material from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s reaction to the Bush administration’s democracy promotion policies in the Middle East in the post 9/11 period, and its 2007 political party platform, to demonstrate that an ‘Islamic’ conception of democracy is shaped by history and ideology in the modern and secular context of the nation-state.

For many decades, political Islamists have benefited from a privileged position, since they acted as the only option to the existing Arab regimes, building on the rejection of the status quo without elaborating on their alternative. They did not need to come up with specific policy prescriptions and, in fact, could hardly provide a clear scenario for society and the political process should they come to power. But once competing for elections and taking on the responsibility to govern, they will be forced to explain their political rationale. This paper offers a critical exploration of the impact the new political and social conditions are having on Islamist political concepts. The electoral success of Islamist parties will put pressure on them to, at long last, define the relation between theory and practice. We will reflect on the implications of the uprisings on the Islamist movements’ evolution, namely their concepts of democracy, the civil state, the separation of powers, and the Sharia and human rights.

Without ruling out democracy in Muslim societies, Samuel Huntington found “din wa-dawla”—the intermingling of religious and political communities—a major challenge. Hrair Dekmejian and Judith Miller had expressed fear, given the lack of a democratic tradition in the Middle East, that after coming to office through elections Muslim political parties—“Islamists”—will scuttle the democratic process itself to stay in power. Yet, the Justice and Democratic Party (AKP) in Turkey did not end democratic institutions following electoral victory in 2002. While denying the United States the use of its territory for military operations against an Arab Muslim country, and being assertive with Israel on regional issues, the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not changed the basic security structure of Turkey’s membership in NATO. In spite of demonstrating pragmatism so far after winning the 2011 elections, will Mohamed Morsi and his Freedom and Justice Party—affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood—take Egypt on a divergent path? Is there any danger to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty? What about United States relations with Turkey or the GCC countries? This paper will address the question of a perceived “Islamist” threat to United States national security interest in the MENA region.

Ottoman Empire has been a kind of “Security Community” by taking of the most of Islamic Countries under its sovereignty for a long time. So It can be said that Ottoman Empire has achieved Karl W. Deutch’s economic orientated “Security Community” model in the context of political scene. But mutual socio economic and politic relationship between Turkey and other Islamic Countries has been at the minimal level after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Founders of Republic was percept the cultural and traditional legacy of the Ottoman Empire as a threat to the ideal of Westernization. Other Islamic countries also not welcome the new policies of Republic of Turkey because they perceived Turkey is turning his face from Islamic traditions. Disconnection between Middle Eastern countries and Turkey causes to two main problems. First, rising of the radicalism and second, regional insecurity. But as a parallel of conjectural changing in Middle East in the last decade, the relationship getting better between Turkey and other Islamic Countries. So this paper focused on question of “How to effect this development rising of the radicalism and the regional security”. This research depends on constructivist approach and used Securisation, Regional Security Complex Theory and Security Community Theory” of Karl W. Deutch.

Turkey’s AKP which is conventionally portrayed as the most successful example of ‘moderate’ political Islam has demonstrated significant difference from earlier Islamist parties by electing significant number of women to the parliament since 2002 elections (13 in 2002, 29 in 2007 and 45 in 2011). This paper seeks to provide an in-depth analysis about the gender ideology of the AKP by dealing with the following questions: ‘How has the AKP approached to the gender equality?’, ‘What kinds of policies have been adopted by the AKP government in order to dis/empower women in education, employment and political participation?’ This paper demonstrates that the gender ideology of the AKP depicts motherhood as an ideal role for women, and since the education of women is in conformity with this ideology, the government has introduced measures to promote higher education of women. However it has not introduced any significant measure to encourage female labor participation and political participation as women working outside the house does not comply with its ideology. The paper illustrates the discursive formation in Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements about the ‘good daughters’ who accept the ideal role of motherhood and ‘bad daughters’ who resist this role and ask for gender equality. An interesting finding of this paper is that even the headscarved women can be depicted as ‘bad daughters’ in the AKP’s discourse when a group of headscarved women launched a campaign for the election of covered women to the parliament before 2011 national elections.

Modern Neo-Patrimonialism and Post-Politics. These are theoretical approaches discussed to a lesser extent in the EU candidate country Turkey in comparison to the discourse in Western Europe. But there is also a lack of in-depth transformation studies on Turkey resorting pre-eminently to the above mentioned approaches and theories of transformation studies and autocracy research in the West. This paper relies upon theories of political transition and autocracy research with a specific focus on the ‘post-political’ rise or Zeitgeist of Islam and its impact on the regime in times of (power) change at the Bosphorus. Now, Post-Politics describes a ‘consensual’ form of democracy with an anti-political vision, refusing the acknowledgement of the antagonistic dimension constitutive of ‘the political’. Its aim is the establishment of a world ‘beyond left and right’ and ‘beyond antagonism’. In the specific case of Turkey, political Islam seems to serve the gradual curtailment of the antagonistic potential existing in society through government’s strong hand. As a consequence, neo-patrimonial elements are gradually creeping in and manifesting itself at the regime level. In this paper the impact of the features of ‘Post-Political’ Islam on the antagonism in the area of politics and society will be analyzed.

Reflecting the growing influence of Shi‘i Islam experts in determining U.S. foreign policy toward the Muslim world, early in his first term in office Obama appointed Vali Nasr as Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Already facing the existing difficulties of developing a workable idea of an Islamic IR theory, scholars, practitioners, and students of IR have however shown little coherent understanding and structured knowledge of Shi‘itology. A field of enquiry in its own right, this used to belong exclusively to a few scholars of Islamic Studies within the Euro-American academia but is increasingly unavoidable for anyone interested in deciphering current Islamic political discourses and the dynamics gradually dominating contemporary international relations. This paper delineates and conceptualizes some major frameworks and layers of understandings IR scholars should be aware of when researching the geopolitics and international relations of countries with a significant Shi‘a presence, taking as case study Iran and Iraq. In particular, it problematizes the different and possibly alternative roles that geography, Shi‘ism, and Islam play in the geopolitics of these countries.

This study seeks to examine how constructivism can help to deep our understanding of the Israeli-Iranian conflict over Iran’s nuclear program. In doing so, the basic tenets of constructivism is unpacked to identify which aspects of the constructivist approach to seeing social reality as derived from the shared understandings of actors would be most suited to this particular case study. Focusing on the manner in which actors create and maintain identities, both for themselves and others, through language use in realm of discourse, the identities of Iran and the Israel is shown to be mutually constituted; that is, the identity of one was, in part (for given contexts), formed in relation to the identity of the other. The central question that this study seeks to answer is: how can the application of a social constructivist approach to the Israeli-Iranian conflict over Iran’s nuclear program enhance our understanding of the nature of this conflict? This study goes beyond Realism to explore the dynamics of the cultural and religious underpinnings of the “clash of narratives” that shape the dynamics of nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran. This paper compares the ways in which Israelis and Iranians utilize sacred text, myths, tradition, national-religious historiography, and “selective memory” to construct and promote their identification with ancient cultures, traditions, and historic grievances. In addition, this study highlights the ways in which Israelis and Iranians use the negative stereotypes of one another especially in nuclear issues to brand and demonize the opponents. This study finally shows the constructivist approach to the Israeli-Iranian conflict over Iran’s nuclear program can expand our understanding of that encounter by underlining the ways in which actors and their representations of any given situation are constructed, rather than being objectively given.

There has been an increasing assertion of the velayat-e-faqih in Iranian politics in recent years. This has led to tensions between them and the presidential office in Iran. Against this backdrop, this article seeks to analyse the constitutional position of the velayat-e-faqih and how it has interacted with other institutions to shape Iranian foreign policy and taking a decisions in nuclear issue. The article critically analyses the relationship between the velayat-e-faqih and different popularly elected presidents. so this study will consists of the following:

first: historical background of Iranian nuclear program and its developments.

second:motivations that encourged iran to acquire nuclear program

third:the role of velayate-e faqih in building iranian nuclear program

fourth: International responses toward Iranian nuclear program

conclusion.