Author: Nassef Manabilang Adiong

Nassef is the founder of Co-IRIS (International Relations and Islamic Studies Research Cohort), PHISO (Philippine International Studies Organization), DSRN (Decolonial Studies Research Network), and BRLN (Bangsamoro Research and Legal Network). He works on interdisciplinary research between Islam and International Relations and explores the Bangsamoro society as he heads the Policy Research and Legal Services (PRLS) of the Bangsamoro Parliament. Visit https://nassef.info/ for more details.

An Islamic International Relations?

The title above of this essay will surely cause havoc in the Western academia of International Relations (IR) particularly those who were trained in an American IR school. European IR schools are somehow pluralistic in terms of how they view IR than their American counterparts. This paper is not an ‘all-knowing’ type of a term project, but it is delimited by an ‘interrogative’ descriptive structure of explanation. It will be about research inquiries on “Islam and International Relations.” How both conceptions perceived each other, its repercussions on implicit and explicit notions of human and society, and if there are mutual or reciprocal relation or relatedness, or in short ‘interrelationships’ constructed?

     But this question is apparently not the primal concern of IR; it may be more of an importance to sociology, psychology, theology and political science. Although, we cannot deny IR’s multidisciplinary approach to its field. For many years since the interwar (interbellum) period, a bulk of IR scholars’ research work has been dealing with statecraft, state-to-state relations, and the international system paying little attention to human affairs or human-to-human or human-to-society relations concomitant the roles of culture, religion, language, and other determining identities. Only then at the post-Cold War period, these matters were given importance, of course, ignited by the constructivist project in the US.
Coming to ____________, Looking for an Intellectual Patronage
When I arrived at the University I did some little research on the faculty list of _____  department and noted those who may help me in this endeavor. I initially talked to Prof.._____ during the registration period and told me that she doesn’t know if my proposed thesis (this was done verbally not the formal process of submitting a thesis proposal) is feasible enough because in her view, ‘why there’s a need to formulate an international relations theory based on religious perspective, if so then, there should be Buddhist, Hindus, Christian and Jewish conception(s) of IR’ and I replied that this is not the point, it’s like you are saying that Islam is similar or identical with other religions or ideologies.
     Further, I lamented that ‘why can Western scholars particularly the pioneers of English School of IR associated their thoughts with Christianity’? Was this because of the Peace of Westphalia’s resolutions to disputes between Catholics and Protestants, and later lead to the establishment of ‘sovereign’ nation-states. Whereby, sovereignty has been so used (rehashed) word for research by IR scholars which resulted to grand concepts like anarchy, self-help system, balance of power, national interests, power, and complex interdependence among others. Though this is not to mean that when the notion of sovereignty emerged, grand concepts that I mentioned immediately were conceived. Simple causation here is not enough but complex method of correlation is the appropriate structure of explanation. 
     Prof. _____ just shrugged me off and answered that my proposal is too ambitious (period). In my mind, there’s no ‘ambitious’ research proposal, only those who concluded their research and failed to defend their work that make it ambitious. Prof. ____ and Prof. _____ responded to my inquiry that they cannot help me in my research work because simply they’re not expert on Islam, but instead, gave me links and other important resources salient to my research. However, when I approached Prof. _____ (we had an interesting discussion that lasted almost an hour or so), it gave me hope and opened my thoughts to many possibilities.
     First, he was asking me with several questions regarding what’s really on my mind. He talked about vehemently avoiding two extreme poles: (1) those who totally ignore Western concepts in Islam because it’s plainly un-Islamic and (2) those who color Western concepts like IR within Islamic prism by putting some Islamic elements. I asked: “can we find a via media or middle way from these two ends of spectrum” because I don’t want to pattern my research in a pendulum way, wherein I might get too adhering to the no. 1 or no. 2 extreme poles? And he answered, it’s possible, if we can rework (adjust) its ontological propositions and find or discover appropriate epistemology. The thing that I can think of is to use a method that is immune and has defensive mechanism in avoiding or capable of fighting these extreme poles.
     But for now I will focus first on asking questions, observing the phenomena, and gathering a plethoric survey of literatures. Secondly, he suggested for possible research undertakings like look into the works of Edward Said, Mohammed Arkoun, Giorgio Shani, al-Zuhili and gave me the Sabet’s book to make some reports. Though I criticized Sabet’s book at first, but suddenly I am overwhelmed by the arguments he presented at the latter up to its ending. He presented a conundrum style of inquiry (like puzzles designed to test for lateral thinking) and basically at those puzzles you can find answers. Certainly, first impression never last (amen). And lastly, he humbly suggested that probably I might alter my research inquiry instead of developing an Islamic theory of IR why not divert my attention to postcolonial studies because (in his words) it’s appropriate and plausible. 
Islam and International Relations, Strange Bedfellows
Islam and International Relations, two intricate terminologies, but how can I make them tangent (meeting along the same line or point)? This is not to sound like an orientalist; projecting the “incompatibility enterprise” thus you cannot find harmony or manipulating the study based on their upbringing or normative biases, e.g., Western culture as point of reference and making it superior than oriental culture. The orientalist has done such a great deal to make Islam incompatible, or worst, hostile with Western values, ideas, norms and traditions. Declaring and pronouncing Islam’s incompatibility with democracy (remember the Western “democratic peace theory” that democratic countries or democracies don’t go to war with one another though this argument can also be associated to opposed totalitarian governments), human rights particularly of women and gay rights, international law, and etc.
     How can we advance our scholarship if we already have a preconceived perception, notion, impression and biases against Islam and its adherents, i.e., the Muslims? Why most IR scholars wrote that the area studies of Middle East in the US failed miserably? According to them, experts of Middle Eastern studies in America failed to predict the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, failed to warn the West about the rise of radical or fundamental Islamic revivalist movements, failed to suggest and give guidelines for policy making procedures or to their foreign policy that would have prevent wars or mitigate hostilities or tensions of the West with the Muslim world.
     I would argue that the reasons above were not the causes that made Middle Eastern studies vulnerable. There is a remarkable preconceived perception that Middle Eastern experts were unimportant in policy making and moreover, most of them were neoconservatives with ‘attached’ Israel propaganda on their belt, e.g., Daniel Pipes (director of the Middle East Forum and Taube), Fouad Ajami (Harvard CIA/Nadav Safran Chair on Middle East Politics), Mark Steyn (a self-proclaimed expert on Muslim culture), Ibn Warraq (founder of the Institute for the Secularisation of Islamic Society) and more.
     The other reasons that IR scholars did not see were my following assumptions or hunches: (1) you cannot penetrate the government’s circle of advisers to the president, the Congress and the Judiciary if your views are pro-Islamic world, (2) you cannot survive the academia in the US if you are straightforwardly criticizing Israel of course with an exception of Edward Said and Noam Chomsky, and (3) be so outwardly visible and outspoken in the US public opinion of your rants against its foreign policy to the Middle East and Israel. Anti-Israel has become a “taboo” in the public sphere of America.  
     Even Edward Said experienced the orientalist backlash. It was right after the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, many reports were pointing out that the suspects were of Middle Eastern origin. Said’s office was bombarded with calls and emails from the media who wants to know his opinion regarding the matter, which the bombing occurred while he was in Canada giving lectures. Said thought that the reason they were calling him because he was apparently from the Middle East; he was a Christian Palestinian. Little did they know that the suspects were homegrown white American citizens.
     How can we avoid, mitigate and solve this “orientalist enterprise?” I suggest that Muslim countries or even non-Muslim countries who sympathized with the goals of Muslim countries can create a multilateral agreement condemning anti-Muslim acts. Muslim countries can invest in the international media to establish a worldwide News company vis-à-vis BBC or CNN. Invest more in the popular culture by creating movies, T.V. series, documentaries, concerts, and other tools propagating or germinating informative means that would directly hit or influence the mass people about the stories in the Muslim world. Muslim countries particularly the Arab world can extensively invest in ‘international education’ by funding researches about Islam, Middle East, and Muslims around the world without political strings attach to it.
     Moving on, we should intensively and rigorously look into the etymology of Islam and International Relations. If we talk about Islam are we referring to the religious aspects of it or the political Islam? Are we speaking of Islam as a total way of life that transcends beyond its religious status? How will Islam provides a structure of explanation in interpreting international relations theory? Is IR embedded within the realms of Islam naturally or constructively? IR scholars see Islam as ‘the otherness’ while most of the Islamic scholars interpret IR as alien. I think this is because of the dogmas or fatwas imposed by the Hanafi school of law which delineated Muslims from non-Muslims by identifying two abodes, the abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and the abode of war (Dar al-Harb). Sometimes most of the early Muslim jurists relegated abode of war as abode of unbelievers (Dar al-Kufr).
     We should be careful in contextualizing these terms and apply it to the present. During the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim jurists placed a third abode which is at the middle or between the first two abodes, the abode of covenant (Dar al-Ahd). It refers to non-Muslim governments which have peaceful relationship (through binding agreements or treaties) with Muslim governments that prioritizes protection and security of Muslims’ land and property. The abode of Islam does not only refer to Muslim nations or states, it also refers to Muslims practicing their faith in a non-Muslim country. As you can see here, the concept of ijtihad or making some independent interpretation for legal decisions had greatly impacted Islam. Since the inception of the four schools of Islamic laws and jurisprudence within the strand of the Sunni tradition, the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I, and Hanbali made Islam (on a positive note) colorful and evolving.
     But on the other hand, weakened Islam due to their different legal interpretations concerning hadith (sayings of Prophet Muhammad) and sometimes they no longer refer to the original source of Islam, the Holy Qur’an. They made conflicting and contradicting fatwa (binding or nonbinding) and legal decisions implemented under the Shari’ah law, a combination of the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah (practices of Prophet Muhammad). But how this will affect in finding convergence with international relations? Declaring and imposing different interpretations of Islam by the Muslim jurists themselves made possible for other Muslim jurists in other parts of the world, e.g., in China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco and etc, to make their own interpretation and sometimes based on their culture to express appropriateness, applicability and adjustment.
     IR scholars tend to perceived and studied Islam on the prism of secularist epistemology of  great Judeo-Christian tradition, i.e., the concept of separation of Church and government. How is it possible to find a middle way between two ends of spectrum? Islam, where religion and politics are in unison, in contrast with IR, where religion and politics are totally separated. It sounds like a melodramatic sentiment with ingredients of Rudyard Kipling famous saying, “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.”
Finding a Remedy?
If we are going to look for some putative solution and avoid hindrances whether ascribing Islam as an ideology or religion towards international relations, then we might find answers. Katerina Dalacoura, a lecturer at LSE, talks about the concept of globalization as a via media framework. She argued that “Islamist movements can be seen as examples of non-state actors par excellence and their impact on the international system can be understood in their capacity to bypass the state and establish direct relations with other societies”[i] The problem I see here is how she’ll be able to differentiate those movements that were state-driven with irredentist motivation from those with Islamicate characterizations. The context of globalization is still debatable whether how Muslim societies are affected and of course how they respond or react from it.
     The remedy I can think of is to construct or reconstruct ontological propositions and find appropriate epistemology to decipher Islam in the ‘schema’ or views of a specific or certain international relations theory. Put simply all possible ideas and concepts together and initially develop a theoretical or conceptual framework. It will guide me in determining what things or variables I should look for.  Though I don’t want to use the word ‘variable’ because it’s a scientific term, however, I see it as a useful word for my research to denote cases supporting my claim or main idea. Consequently, most of what I have written here is inquiring ideas that bedazzling my mind regarding Islam and IR.
     On a side note or let’s say a caveat: if this proposal did not work and might be in the future holds me in a stalemate or in a state of deadlock, thus resulting into infeasibility and implausibility of the undertaken research. Then, I have no choice but to move to plan B which is (another one of my research passion aside from Islamic IR) analyzing the political elites of the Middle East by employing methods and theories of political psychology. I will start in Turkey by deconstructing the operational codes of the three political elites, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu on how they viewed, perceived and influenced Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East.

[i] She sent me her piece on “Political Islam and International Relations: A Dangerous Case of Mutual Neglect?” where she delivered it at the International Studies Association annual conference, Montreal, 20 march 2004. This quotation was also taken from her work on “Islamist Movements as Non-state Actors and their Relevance to International Relations” in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

Essays on English School of International Relations: R.J. Vincent (7 of 7)

R.J. Vincent idea on human rights is actually synonymous with his reconceptualized human rights where he termed it as “basic rights.” Historically, human rights were justified and defined in an abstract way of reasoning, that are, the first one it is equated to natural or canon law for human beings have the same rights because all of them are members of human community, thus it is universal; the second one is the establishment of formal obligations, treatise among societies or authorities and mutual obligations and rights are defined by acceptance of both parties. The third one which is different from the two aforementioned abstract reasons is the notion of cultural relativism that involves a non-universal doctrine because it is cultural specific in view of different civilizations. He defined basic right to life as rights that are necessary for the enjoyment of other rights. He considered right to security, subsistence and freedom as requirements for benevolent survival. Further, he laid three arguments: (1) humanitarian intervention means if the state violate the basic right to life and having a minimum content on containing rights to security and subsistence, (2) legitimacy is when a state’s legitimacy is recognized by other states, and (3) involves unity and diversity in international society and which content of basic rights must be kept confidential, again the idea of pacta sunt servanda.
     In this essay we will look on the notion of human intervention in contemporary world politics vis-à-vis Vincent’s first argument above. The expression of humanitarian sentiments in world politics is a product of changing historical and social processes. World or domestic events alter or affect different sentiments that individuals experiences. It is left for the international community in addressing graved humanitarian crisis like what had happened in Rwanda (1994) and Sbrenica (1995). Presently, Sudan’s Darfur is also facing this kind of tragic and worst problem could ever happen in a state or community of peoples. Traditionally, intervention has been defined as a forcible breach of sovereignty that interferes in state’s internal affairs. The legality of forcible humanitarian intervention is a matter of dispute between restrictionists and counter-restrictionists.[i]
     The restrictionists perspective pointed out that: (1) States will not intervene for primarily humanitarian reasons. (2) States are not allowed to risk their soldiers’ lives on humanitarian crusades. (3) States will abuse a right of humanitarian intervention using it as a cloak to promote national interests. (4) States will apply principles of humanitarian intervention selectively. (5) Disagreement on what principles should govern a right of humanitarian intervention. For the counter-restrictionists perspective raises significant questions like: (1) Protection of human rights. (2) A customary right of humanitarian intervention. (3) The moral choice of states to involve in humanitarian intervention. These questions were very controversial among lawyers of international law and raise the ire of the authority of the international judicial bodies, e.g. International Criminal Court (ICC).
     Remember when the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for the arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, President of Sudan, last March 4, 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He is suspected of being criminally responsible, as an indirect co-perpetrator, for intentionally directing attacks against an important part of the civilian population of Darfur, Sudan, murdering, exterminating, raping, torturing and forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians, and pillaging their property. This is the first warrant of arrest ever issued for a sitting Head of State by the ICC.[ii]
     Sovereignty has been the cardinal stance of a state in enforcing its domestic affairs under its jurisdiction. It was conceptualized after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, giving state an equivocal power to perform its duties and obligations to its citizens. However, as time goes by, new concepts and ideas are being developed in order to interpret the current situation of states in an international society. The reason being was the effects of events on how states interact with each other and other actors (individuals, international organizations, MNCs, social movements or NGOs) become an emergent importance in carrying-out roles that states are incapable to maintain and enhance cosmopolitan interpretation of a normative order, though some were pursuing goals based on interests. Ideas like society of states, complex interdependence, and globalization have contributed in modifying the traditional definition of intervention consonance with prospects for humanitarian purposes or how IR practitioners would say a ‘common humanity’. 
     The debate on humanitarian intervention between restrictionists and counter-restrictionists regarding who shapes, dictates, interpret human rights; what constitute a moral right of an individual; are there limitations of ethical responsibilities of agents (with international status) in global politics; were questions need to be elaborated and pondered upon. The arrest order issued by the International Criminal Court to the head of state of Sudan, is it an exception to the immunity bestowed to heads of states when they agreed on the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations in 1964?
     There are several ideas made by man that later will appear in conflict or contradict with their former constructed ideas. If we will live in theories of man, I think our lives will be unproductive. I am saying this because we have seen so much human sufferings all over the world perpetuated by subjects in international law because their duty changed for whatever circumstances they’ve encountered. They will have infinite debates whether humanitarian intervention is right or wrong or whether what constitute human rights, i.e. whether the definition should be based on the culture of a society or in a cosmopolitan understanding, but still it will not change the fact that both parties must arrive at a compromise decision and act based on common understanding to address the phenomena, may it be complex or not, or else the future of humanity will be endanger.
[i] Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Alex J. Bellamy (2001): “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics” (pp. 470-493) in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, John Baylis and Steve Smith. (2nd ed.) Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
[ii] Available here from one of the online published statements of ICC.

Essays on English School of International Relations: Michael Donelan (6 of 7)

I will assess the five different views bestowed by Michael Donelan on the nature of international politics. According to him there are five views or elements that comprises the nature of international politics, these are natural law, realism, rationalism, fideism and historicism.[i] There are two concepts related to the natural law tradition: (1) common morality (reflection on the sense of humanity) and (2) common good (the individual prioritization of both moral virtues and what is good unto himself and to others). He opined that both common morality and common good are essentially built to human beings which actually a staunch distinction from non-human beings. These two ideals provide guidelines of reason and are universal in nature for it aspires good for all which can be done in different levels (be they national or multinational levels). He argued that common morality and common good were both given with regards to natural law tradition. If both were naturally given, are they subject to change? Are there any consequences that common morality and common good can be alter if human beings themselves cannot attain commonalities in moral virtues and goodness of values. What are the permutations of natural law to divine law since I understood that the author is a devout catholic? Who authorizes or speaks for morality and law?
     His idea on realism is similar with the common and general understanding of realism. That state is driven by power which pursues peculiar national interest in an anarchical world or in a self-help system. Security depends upon other state’s recognition and action. They exist with the consideration that other states also exist. The idea of common morality and common good is null and void. Only in the domestic realm of state such morality and law exists and are provided by domestic authorities as well, i.e., executive and judiciary branch of the government. Realism gave little attention or regards morality, ethics and especially common good insignificant or unimportant in the conduct of state affairs. For them reason of state alone can present an encompassing description in viewing the predicament of international politics. And since real politik (struggle for power) is the name of the game, states do not trust one another. However, we should also consider the taxonomy of power and how it greatly affected the realist’s thesis. Power can be presented in different forms: power of language, mind, discourse, physical or material (economic and/or military), and ideas and ideologies. But I think we all have common understanding that when we talk about realist conception of power we are concern with high politics such as political prominence and military capabilities.
     Rationalism for Donelan starts with three concepts: (1) self, which means I exists (in my conscious mind), (2) freedom and (3) equality. These concepts set out the foundation of human society. It is the belief that when you think you exist and that you recognizes other’s existence then both of you exist freely, and when you think all of us exist freely, and then we will think that all of us are equal. The simplicity of their correlations is outrageous, it doesn’t mean that when you believed you exists it inevitably leads you to believe other’s exists or else you may ask whether the pleasantries of life lead me to believe that I exists. How about the unpleasant situation that others experienced, will they be also (immediately) believe that they exists and recognizes the existences of other so we are both free and equal? Equality comes into many textures whether women and men, men and gays, black and white, Europeans and Asians are equal and with similar perceptions as to how they see themselves.  In this view, commonalities do not come from and built in all human beings; instead, it comes from observation, examination, and reason of human being. In taking consideration of the idea of the good of all, this is to say that the function of international politics is to make every individual compatible with the achievement of common good. According to Donelan, there are four principles of society of states which were patterned from the foundations of human society: (1) the belief that each state is free, (2) all states are equal, (3) agreements should be kept or pacta sunt servanda, and (4) justice should be done, hitherto with its implementation that three laws are provided – possessions should be respected, any transfer of possessions should be done by consent and not by accession, and promises made should be fulfilled. In this argument it entails that private life is more important than public life, which I think resonates that private international law has more weight than public international law (if we will take it into the state-level).
     In Dr. Yurdusev lecture, he oriented us that Michael Donelan was a devout catholic so it follows that his line of thinking is influenced by strong affiliations to the dogmas of Catholic Church. He included fideism as the fourth element in looking and viewing the nature of international politics. This is the belief that faith supersedes reason or faith is independent from reason and that it provides more basis in arriving at particular truths. In short, faith and reason are both hostile or in contradictory with each other. How can this idea be an element or view in international politics and in what method will suffice international milieu? Donelan argued that morality and law should be based on faith alone, but if scholars interpret it on the basis of reason then selfishness prevails. Furthermore, the so-called universal community of believers is regulated by law revealed by divine providence and the authority, of course, comes from the church, in which Donelan regarded the church as the only entrusted institution for such great authority. But how can this argument applicable to international politics when most, if not all, are composed of states adhering to secularism, the idea that all of the activities and duties in politics and governance must be under the authority of the government while religious and spiritual activities is to church only. The community of believers is even under the authority of the government and to which foreign policy is undertaken, which shapes how they (members of the government) act and play their role in the international community.
     The last element is that international politics must be viewed historically. This is again one of the major features of the British School of International Relations – historicism in their epistemological pluralism. Donelan argued that reality is something historical. But I contend if we can say that reality of the present is an extension of the reality of the past? What is the ‘something’ that reality is historical? Is this base on certain scenarios depicting historical accounts to form reality? In addition, reason, morality, interests and etc for him were historically conceived juxtaposed to an occurrence of life which continuously flows and probably might change. If reason, morality, interests and other notions which make-up the international politics were historically conceived then it follows that the changing component of these notions were not constant. I can accept that historicism is one way of conceiving these notions but there are also other plausible factors conceiving these matters. We can take on the empiricism and other methodologies applicability.
     In sum, the five views or elements on the nature of international politics are somehow overlapping, tension arises on some notions like ideas on morality and law in describing and explaining under the context of each element, and compounded by escalating confusions on part of Donelan’s understanding of the complex phenomena of the nature of international politics.
[i] See Michael Donelan, “Elelments of International Political Theory,” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

Essays on English School of International Relations: Adam Watson (5 of 7)

In this essay I would like to discuss the idea of Adam Watson on the practice of hegemony[i], though this was not discussed in the class I think it is imperative that we should also consider the changing or development of the mind of the author. The discussion here will focus on Watson’s lecture notes given at the CSD Encounter with Adam Watson, University of Wistminster (5 June 2002). The lecture was entitled, “International Relations & the Practice of Hegemony.”[ii] In his lecture he presented two interpretations of the word hegemony, that are, in terms of distribution of power (military force, and technical and financial strengths) in a system, the other one is the dominance of a particular idea or set of assumptions such as (in his words) economic liberalism and globalization. But for him, hegemony is a “material condition that enables one great power or group of powers, or the great powers in a system acting collectively, to bring such great pressures and inducements to bear that most other states lose some of their freedom of action de facto, though not  de jure.”
     His definition is very timely if we will apply it with how collective efforts of states try to subvert, force or constrain a suspected state to behave in a certain way that is advantageous to them. Take for example the US and the coalition of the willings on the war on terror or the sanctions and embargo imposed by major powers, by the UN Security Council or by the US allies to Iran. But there is a loosely description in his conception of hegemony, this is how hegemon A able to persuade other hegemons B, C, and D (if we will talk about world in terms of its territorial influence, region or hemisphere) to behave in a way that their interests are the same with the interest of hegemon A? So the loss of some of the state’s freedom of action can also be both de facto (concerning by principle) and de jure (concerning by law) because a hegemon try to institutionalize the consent enterprise she got from other hegemons.
     My idea about hegemon is that a state will be considered hegemon if she has an immense wealth (material like technological and financial forces) and dominant ideological strength that affect and influence the foreign policies of other state in one region, not only external relations also domestic relations within a state. China is the hegemon in Asia (East, Central and Southeast), India is the hegemon in South Asia, Brazil is the hegemon in South America and South Africa is the hegemon in Africa. Contending issues arises on who are the hegemons in the Middle East (Southwest Asia) if it’s Iran, Israel or Turkey and also in Europe whether United Kingdom, France or Germany. United States was the hegemon after the disintegration of the USSR, but her hegemony in the world is being contested as well because of the global financial crises (2007 to present) and failed wars in Afghanistan (2001 to present) and in Iraq (2003 to present).
     For Watson, the idea of hegemony needs a thorough and rigorous and systematical study of the impact of non-governmental actors on the international system. By this he meant the arising power of non-state actors in the realm of international system. He argued that there is a pendulum of hegemonial spectrum; at the end of the pendulum ideas like sovereignty, anti-hegemonial coalitions, balance of power, juridical equality of states, non-intervention, splendid isolation and the Republican party’s aim of aloofness in the US today come from the multiple independences end of the spectrum while at the other end, ideas like management of the international system, privileges and responsibilities of great powers and rich nations, concert of Europe, intervention, standards of civilization, human rights and women’s rights, donor and recipient states, strings to aid, derogations of sovereignty, and limits to independence come from the hegemony-suzerainty area of the spectrum. These are the element of ideas that two area of spectrum are in contrast with: (1) multiple independences end of the spectrum and (2) hegemony-suzerainty area of the spectrum.
     In addition, there are three tendencies in the policies of great powers help shape the international system: (1) national interest or imperialism, (2) Prudence which he means minimizing risks to the state itself and also to the international society in which it operates, e.g., seeking agreements and acquiescence, and (3) moral responsibility. These three policy-tendencies do not only help shape the international system but it also maintains and preserves stability of the current status-quo.
     In Watson words, the non-governmental actors or what he calls transnational organizations can influence or try to influence the situation in countries they are attached with. He categorized transnational NGOs into three motives of images: (1) economic motives and interests because transnational business can bring pressures and inducements, (2) the moral causes: these are special interest groups range from religious and ideological bodies through all sorts of well-intentioned concerns, as he puts it. (3) He described this as the smallest group of all; this is the organized transnational NGOs with philanthropic enterprises which operate not on the basis of earning profits but for (believe it or not) ethical reasons. All of these groups have one aim and that is to change the internal affairs of weaker or less democratic states.
     Consequently, Watson idea on hegemony is a great attempt to re-interpret or redefine the word hegemony beyond the borders of its state-centric definition and connotation. Adding transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as one of the forms of hegemony gives a deeper understanding on the roles they play in the contemporary world politics or of the international system. However, one thing should also be dealt with intensive research is the aftermath of clashes between state imposing its hegemony in the world affairs and transnational NGOs impact on its ‘try and error’ method on modifying internal politics or situations in the state. To what extent can the hegemonial status of transnational NGOs lasts in the state with a status also of being a hegemon? Conflict between state’s hegemonial operations to transnational NGO’s hegemonial operations is the recommended subject-area that other scholars might try to look into or by Watson himself (to advance his scholarship on understanding the phenomenon of hegemony in the international system).

[i] See Adam Watson, Hegemony and History, (New York: Routledge, 2006).
[ii] Accessed here, 22 November 2009.

Essays on English School of International Relations: Hedley Bull (4 of 7)

I will answer one of the posited questions stated in the course outline, this is “to what extent does Bull’s conception of international society comply with the contemporary international relations?” The question gives me an impression of (un)certain putative degree or level about the compliance of Bull’s international society to the current milieu of international relations. We should first analyze what is the definition of international society for Hedley Bull[i]. He defined it “when a group of states conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”[ii] This is different when he meant for system of states which according to him is “formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.”[iii] I would also add from Dr. Yurdusev lecture that a system is when a state takes into consideration of the other state – be they existence, actions, or recognitions.
     It is difficult to decipher if Bull’s conception of international society complies or not to the contemporary (practice of) international relations or to what extent it comply because of the tensions and contradictions purported by Bull himself. Though I would contend that he is finding a middle way between realism and cosmopolitanism. Bull’s argued that there were universal goals of social life, that are, to secure life from violence, to ensure promises will be kept and to ensure that the possession of things will remain stable, these goals set the primary goals of international society. These were preservation of the system and of the society of states itself, maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, maintaining peace (or peace in the absence of war), limitation of violence, keeping of promises, and rules of property.[iv]
     If these were the goals then what are the courses or operationalizations to attain the goals of an international society? Bull did not give a direct bulleted courses or operations to attain the goals of his conception on international society instead he laid down functions of integral components of the contemporary international system. Functions of balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great powers were outlined in the book “The Anarchical Society.” I do not think that these functions can help me sort out if his international society complies with the contemporary international relations. Detailing the functions or even redefining the elements that composes the international society to fit to what he has conceptualized does not mean that it can be relegated as operations or courses for states to achieve an international society. Thus I would argue that these are just guidelines for states and not instructions imposed unto them. It is still within the prerogative of the state whether she will comply with the guidelines set by Hedley Bull. With this I mean that a scholar is making suggestions on what courses of actions should a state undertake, and not the other way around where a scholar is part of the government mission or an advisor like Henry Kissinger et al. This is still much debatable whether the advancement of scholarship or learning of a scholar should be utilized by the government in order to color a certain political agenda.
     Let us now analyze Bull’s definition of international society concomitant to what extent does it complies with the contemporary international relations. By this I meant the practice of international relations and not the discipline itself. He started the definition with ‘when a group of states conscious of certain common interests and common values’: my question here is how can you instill or trigger consciousness to a group of people (this also bothers me about what does he mean by a group of people – is it with common culture, language, traditions, norms and/or ethnical, racial or religious bounded) is it by following a certain identical pattern(s) of ideology(ies) or belief(s) or a lineage or pedigree of sense of belongingness to one’s own values and interests. The certainty of common interests and common values is to me an uncertain panacea. The second predicate of his definition is to ‘form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’; existing consciousness of certain common values and interests does not necessarily lead them to form a society which is bounded by set of rules and institutions. There will always be pressures, conflicts and clashes among a group of people in every trajectory or projection of how they see themselves and how they see (perceive) the world.
     The only thing (if I could use this term) that I can see nearer to but not epitomizes his conception of international society is the European Union (EU) while all other regional and international organizations are far or have not committed nor complied to the standard of his international society. Even inside EU we cannot avoid the fact that there are pathologies (vulnerabilities and weaknesses) and parochial interests besetting the organization. From the parochial interests of different subgroups, rationality of individual actors to the striving sectional interests groups contributed to the intrinsic complexity of the society. When the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, did this country even acknowledged a little bit or sense of Bull’s idea. If I remember it correctly, it was in the lecture of Dr. Yurdusev that he said: “Bull’s last article condemned the two great powers, the US and Russia, for their horrendous irresponsibility which escalated a chaotic world and did not care about the plight of the third world.” Furthermore, his thesis is inapplicable to Middle East which was highly and deeply penetrated region from different interests of major powers in the world since the inception of the first (alternative) Middle East state.
     You cannot even rely to the attainments of his goals for an international society when even states killed its own citizens, look what happened in Rwanda, in Bosnia (Srebrenica) and now in Darfur, Sudan. How about the distinct varied cultures of Asia, South America and Africa that don’t want to be subdued to Western values? The Palestinian, Chechen, Kurdish and Moro (Southern Philippines) problems, questions in the Basque, Kuriles, Cyprus, Kashmir, Spratly and Sabah territories and low politics issue areas, e.g., environmental challenges (climate change, global warming, deforestation, desertification and toxic wastes), energy/water crisis, rapid population ageing, refugees/internally displaced persons, transnational crimes (human trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, piracy, and small arms smuggling), food security (GMOs or Genetically Modified Organisms), and weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and radiological weapons). These are just some, if not all, burdens that the contemporary international relations encounter. So I am not shock if one day there will be World War III but hopefully all the means and ways must be done to prevent this catastrophic event.  

[i] There is one good source, a tribute to Hedley Bull about his life and ideas before he died. The book is so concise yet presents a comprehensive accounts and details of his world view and schema but of course with critical perspectives from the authors. This is the edited book of J.D.B. Miller and R.J. Vincent’s “Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
[ii] Hedley Bull, “The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 13)
[iii] ibid, p. 9.

[iv] Another online source that reviewed the book can be found here.